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The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes the
validity of two forms of marriage: permanent and temporary. Temporary
marriages, referred to as mut'a or sigheh, between Muslim men and
women are contractual arrangements that legally unite them for a desig-
nated amount of time and for which the temporary wife is paid. For
various reasons, the current regime in Iran, under the leadership of
President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, promotes the institution of temporary
marriages. The government views this form of marriage as a pragmatic
way for individuals to satisfy their sexual desires within legal confines.
Legal control of individuals' sexual relations, officials believe, will
promote family stability and ultimately social harmony.
Despite the legal and religious sanctioning of temporary marriages,
Iranians do not commonly engage in them.' Individuals reject this
institution as religiously illegitimate and morally reprehensible. Some
have even likened the institution to "legalized prostitution."2 The institu-
tion appears progressive because, as will be illustrated in Part V, it
represents a recognition of the sexual needs of individuals.3 However,
the formal and substantive characteristics of the institution, discussed in
Part IV, also signal regressive tendencies - the institution seems to be
designed to meet men's needs and their sexual urges, and women are
given fewer rights than men when contracting into these relationships.
* Northwestern University, B.A. (1991); University of Michigan Law School, J.D.
(1994).
1. Gelareh Asayesh, Iran: The Rules of Courtship, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 4, 1991, at B 1.
This was also true before the revolution: "Temporary marriage hardly flourishes except
around the great sanctuaries and places of pilgrimage, as brothels were formerly near the
cathedrals of the West." Paul Vieille, Iranian Women in Family Alliance and Sexual Politics,
in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 451, 466 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978).
2. Jane Khatib-Chahidi, Sexual Prohibitions, Shared Space and Fictive Marriages in
Shi'ite Iran, in WOMEN AND SPACE: GROUND RULES AND SOCIAL MAPS 112, 126 (Shirley
Ardener ed., 1981). Journalist Trudy Rubin has discovered that "[n]ot all women are enthusi-
astic about the sigheh. Some working-class women complained that their husbands use any
spare cash to contract temporary marriages for a few hours, turning sigheh into virtual
prostitution." Trudy Rubin, Women Still Getting Arrested for Improper Dress in Iran,
GAZETrE (Montreal), July 6, 1991, at B3.
3. One author has remarked, "[T]he custom of mut'a ... seems to me to be possessed of
some merits and, on the whole, somewhat more enlightened than prostitution." A.G. Mojtabai,
Hers, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1980, at C2.
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The current scholarship regarding temporary marriages has two
major flaws. First, the topic is underanalyzed by both Shi'a and Sunni
Islamic sources.4 This dearth of research is more evident in work of
Sunni Muslims. 5 Sunni Muslims do not recognize the legitimacy of this
institution, which was outlawed by the second Caliph, Omar, a follower
of the Prophet Muhammad.6 Though not recognized officially, however,
there is evidence which indicates that Sunni Arabs do engage in mut'a
(though as infrequently as Shi'a Iranians).
A second criticism of the current scholarship, applicable to both
Western and Islamic sources, relates to the lack of objectivity with
which mut'a is analyzed. Shi'a Islamic sources generally praise the
institution as a solution to the problems that can be caused by un-
checked human sexual urges and needs. Temporary marriage is seen as
a legitimate and progressive way in which Islam deals with the sexual
nature of human beings, while preserving traditional Islamic values.7
Western-educated authors, both scholars and journalists, suffer from the
same lack of objectivity, but their bias is more critical of the institution.
These Western sources rarely attempt to analyze the tradition of mut'a
and the validity of its rationales. Instead, they focus on criticism, specif-
ically, of the institution's tendencies to place women in an inferior
position vis-t-vis men.8
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the institution of mut'a criti-
cally, but objectively. It is important to first understand that it is possi-
ble to learn something from this institution. The sanctioning of tempo-
rary marriages illustrates the pervasive role of law as a method of social
4. See infra note 14 for an explanation of the differing sects in Islam and the distinction
between the Shi'a and Sunni sects.
5. See JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 57-59 (1990). Nasir
briefly deals with the distinction between the two types of marriages, and he focuses predomi-
nantly on the rationales for the Sunni ban of the institution.
6. SHAHLA HAERI, LAW OF DESIRE: TEMPORARY MARRIAGE IN SHI'I IRAN 50 (1988).
Sunnis "consider mut'a the same as prostitution; hence the practice is banned by all Sunni
legal schools." Guity Nashat, Women in the Ideology of the Islamic Republic, in WOMEN AND
REVOLUTION IN IRAN 205 (Guity Nashat ed., 1983).
The Prophet Muhammad was succeeded by four undisputed Caliphs, or leaders. They
were Abu Bakr (632-34), Omar ibn al-Khattab (634-44), Uthman ibn Affan (644-56), and
Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-61). For a history of the Caliphate period in Islam, see JOHN L.
ESPOSITO, ISLAM, THE STRAIGHT PATH 40-44 (1988).
7. See generally MORTEZA MOTAHERI, NEZAM-E HOGHOGH-E ZAN DAR ISLAM (16th ed.
1992); MOUSAVI ZANJAN ROODI, EZDEVAJ: EZDEVAJ-E MOVAGHAT-O-ASAR-E AN DAR
ESLAH-E JAME-E (1992); RUHOLLAH KHALEGHI, EZDEVAJ-O-MASAEL-E JENSI (6th ed.
Winter).
8. See, e.g., Nashat, supra note 6; HAERI, supra note 6; Rubin, supra note 2; Haleh
Afshar, Women, Marriage and the State in Iran, in WOMEN, STATE, AND IDEOLOGY: STUDIES
FROM AFRICA AND ASIA 70 (Haleh Afshar ed., 1987).
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control, a characteristic which has parallels in the West. Furthermore,
the institution may be challenged on its merits. For example, this Note
intends to illustrate how the lack of formalism and the presence of great
ambiguity in the institution have contributed to its lack of acceptance in
Iranian society. The institution's deficiencies demonstrate the necessity
of formality and clarity in any legal institution.
In Part II of the Note, a brief outline of Iranian political history is
included, laying the foundation for the historical reasons for the exis-
tence of temporary marriages. Part III illustrates the historical evolution
of Iranian attitudes towards women. It concentrates on the. traditional
Islamic perception of women, and it shows how this viewpoint has
affected the current status of women in Iran. This analysis serves as
important background to the main focus of the Note.
In Part IV, the Note assesses the Islamic rules with regard to tempo-
rary marriages. Initially, it will discuss the characteristics and limitations
of marriages in Islam. In particular, Part IV contrasts the temporary
marriage with the permanent alternative. Part V of the Note seeks to
evaluate the institution of temporary marriages in Iranian society. It
highlights justifications for the existence of temporary marriages and
contains an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of this
form of union. The analysis will examine why, despite the legality of
this institution, Iranians so infrequently engage in it.
I. A BRIEF POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF IRAN
Iranian history dates to the time of the Persian empire under the
Achaemenid Dynasty beginning about 2500 years ago. 9 Between that
time and 1906, when the first Constitution was ratified, Iran had been
predominantly ruled as an absolute monarchy."0 The Iranian legal system
9. The label "Persia" is a Western reference to Iran. It is a Latin word derived from the
Greek word persis. The name "Iran" Was derived from the word arya, referring to the aryan
race, and was the term that the inhabitants of the country historically used to refer to them-
selves. REUBEN LEVY, THE PERSIAN LANGUAGE 1 (1951). For a history of ancient Persia and
the Persian Empire, see generally J.M. COOK, THE PERSIAN EMPIRE (1983) and ROBERT W.
ROGERS, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PERSIA: FROM ITS EARLIEST BEGINNINGS TO THE DEATH OF
ALEXANDER THE GREAT (1929).
10. S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 49 (1985). Amin states that
[t]he ancient Persian monarchy was an absolute monarchy; the King's will ex-
pressed in word was law (dad or dat in ancient Persian). However, the interpreta-
tion of the words used by the King was generally determined in consultation with
nobles and officials .... The King was also advised by 'royal judges' of the
applicable rules and legal norms[.]
Id. at 51.
Winter 1994]
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has changed dramatically throughout this period, but despite these
changes, the government has consistently exerted a great deal of control
over the Iranian population.
During the Sassanian Dynasty (224-651), Iranians were predomi-
nantly of the Zoroastrian faith. They derived their rules and norms of
behavior from the Zend Avesta, the holy book of the Zoroastrians;
additionally, there is an indication that they used the laws of the Code
of Hammurabi." The Sassanian Dynasty collapsed when Islamic con-
querors invaded Iran beginning around 640 A.D., ushering in a period in
which the legal system changed to incorporate Islamic legal principles.
Under the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1722), Islamic law became firmly
ingrained in the Iranian legal system.' 2 The Safavid Kings (or Shahs)
declared Shi'a 3 Islam to be the official religion of Iran.14 They central-
ized the judiciary and created a bifurcated system of State and Islamic
courts, with the ultimate authority residing in the central government
and the Shah. 15 Islamic courts derive Islamic law from the following
sources: (1) the Qu'ran, the Islamic holy book, which contains many
enumerated rules of conduct; 6 (2) tradition or sunna, which are the
11. Id. at 52.
12. For a history of the Safavid Dynasty, see generally ROGER M. SAVORY, STUDIES ON
THE HISTORY OF SAFAWID IRAN (1987) and ROGER SAVORY, IRAN UNDER THE SAFAVIDS
(1980).
13. Shi'a (also spelled Shi'i, Shi'at, or Shi'ite) is an Arabic term referring to the follow-
ers of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. Shireen Mahdavi, The Position of
Women in Shi'a Iran: Views of the 'Ulama, in WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: NEW VOICES OF CHANGE 255, 256 (E. Fernia ed., 1985). Today more than 90% of the
people of Iran belong to the Shi'a sect. Iran, in POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 1992,
at 353, 354 (Arthus S. Banks ed., 1992) [hereinafter POLITICAL HANDBOOK].
14. The two predominant sects in Islam are Shi'a and Sunni. The Sunni represent the
majority of Moslems. The split between the two sects revolves mainly around their leadership.
The Shi'a claim that the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali, his son-in-law, to be his rightful
successor, but the Sunni reject this claim. Both the Sunni and Shi'a sects have further split
into differing schools of thought. The Safavid Shahs claimed that they were direct descen-
dants of the Prophet, and adopted Shi'ism as the State religion of Iran in order to legitimize
their authority. See generally Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 256-57. For more details regarding
the historical split and differences between the two sects, see EsPOSITO, supra note 6, at
47-56; Fuad I. Khuri, The Ulama: A Comparative Study of Sunni and Shi'a Religious Offi-
cials, 23 MIDDLE E. STUD. 291 (1987).
15. AMIN, supra note 10, at 53.
16. Muslims believe that the Qur'an, or Koran, is the living word of God, as revealed by
the Prophet Muhammad. NASIR, supra note 5, at 19-20; YAHYA NOORI & SAYED HASSAN
AMIN, LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
IRAN AND PAKISTAN 14-15 (1987); ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 79-80. The Qur'an enumerates
many rules for human conduct:
Islam is a religion of rules and laws, but it is more than a religion. It is a way of
life for its followers. Its laws govern every aspect of the human interaction. The
believer is told what he can or cannot eat or drink. There are rules in Islam which
govern the believers' sexual activity, family interaction, business transactions, etc.
[Vol. 15:645
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compiled sayings and ways of the Prophet Mohammed;17 (3) common
consent, or ijima, which is used "to resolve unprecedented problems[,]"''
although "[c]ommon consent as a source of law in Islam is an opinion
adapted and expressed by all eminent religious and learned individuals
of the Muslim Society, and unlike democracy it does not give any
weight to the views of ordinary citizens;"' 9 and (4) logical deduction, or
aql, which is unique to the Shi'a legal system as an independent source
of law.20 This last source is quite a useful tool because it enhances the
flexibility of the Shi'a legal system and judges can "use aql for reform
appropriate to the times and circumstances and in keeping with Islamic
doctrines."
21
The absolute rule of the Iranian Shahs weakened under the Qajar
Dynasty (1787-1925)22 when liberal movements and Western influence
on the Dynasty contributed' to the successful ratification of the first
Constitution.23 Western influence began in the nineteenth century with
the Russians, British, and French vying for control and influence in
Iran.' In the twentieth century, the United States also began to take an
interest and intervened in Iranian affairs.25
Nayer Honarvar, Behind the Veil: Women's Rights in Islamic Societies, 6 J. FAM. L. 355, 361
(1988).
17. NOORI & AMIN, supra note 16, at 15-16; ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 80-83.
18. NOORI & AMIN, supra note 16, at 16-17. S.H. Amin, Iran, in 5 LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 18 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1992) [hereinafter LEGAL
ASPECTS].
19. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 18, at 18.
20. NOORI & AMIN, supra note 16, at 17. If a judge does not find applicable rules using
the first three sources, he can use logical deduction and "apply an accepted principle or an
assumption which according to his wisdom and knowledge might best fit the problem."
LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 18, at 19. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 84.
21. Alexandra J. Zolan, The Effect of Islamization on the Legal and Social Status of
Women in Iran, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 183, 192 (1987). "Islam encourages scholars to
interpret the Qur' an and the Sunna. This exercise of independent judgment is not only invited
but praised." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 361.
22. For a history of the Qajar Dynasty, see generally A.K.S. LAMBTON, QAJAR PERSIA:
ELEVEN STUDIES (1987) and HASAN-E FASAI, FARSNAMA-YE NASERI [HISTORY OF PERSIA
UNDER QAJAR RULE] (Herbert Busse trans., 1972).
23. IRAN, THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: STATISTICAL AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF
THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEAR 1993-94i at 778 (Brian Hunter ed., 1993)
[hereinafter STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK].
24. For a history of foreign intervention in Iran, see generally HOUSHANG SABAHI,
BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA I918-I925 (1990); Mikhail Volodarsky, Persia's Foreign Policy
Between the Two Herat Crises, 1831-56, 21 MIDDLE E. STUD. 111 (1985); Michael
Volodarsky, Persia and the Great Powers, 1856-1869, 19 MIDDLE E. STUD. 75 (1983);
Michael P. Zirinsky, Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah,
1921-1926, 24 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 639 (1992).
25. For incidents of U.S. intervention in Iran, see generally WILLIAM MORGAN SHUSTER,
THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA (1987); Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran, 19
Winter 1994)
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The Constitution of 1906 created a secular judicial system and
incorporated European ideas into Iranian laws. From that time through
the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979),26 the government largely codified the
Iranian legal system, directly translating many of the laws from Europe-
an, especially French, codes. 27 They minimized the influence of religion
on the law but maintained the dual-court system created under the
Safavid Dynasty.2 ' The legal system looked predominantly to the follow-
ing sources of law: statute; Supreme Court decisions; general custom
and usage; and the writings of Iranian and French legal scholars. It
limited the role of shari'a (Islamic legal jurisprudence) to personal
matters.29
With the Islamic revolution of 197930 came a reversal of much of
the legal reform by the Qajar and Pahlavi Dynasties. The revolution
"marked the end of an era of accelerated Westernization, and in its place
there was established a traditional Islamic State embodying traditional
Islamic values.",31 The government enacted the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, which adopted the shari'a and the Shi'a school
INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 261 (1987); Moyara de Morales Ruehsen, Operation 'Ajax'
Revisited: Iran, 1953, 29 MIDDLE E. STUD. 467 (1993).
26. Reza Khan
took control after a coup on 31 Oct. 1925 deposed the last Shah of the Qajar
Dynasty, and became Reza Shah Pahlavi on '12 Dec. 1925. The country's name
was changed to Iran on 21 March 1935. Reza Shah abdicated on 16 Sept. 1941 in
favour of his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.
STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 23, at 778
27. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 18, at 17. The Civil Code "is based mainly on the
Islamic law. However, it provides certain novel and modern rules of law adopted from the
European civil codes." Id. The other codes are also influenced by Western legal scholarship,
containing similar patterns of rules while differing on the specifics.
28. AMIN, supra note 10, at 59. "Under the Shahs, the jurisdiction of Shi'a jurists had
been steadily declining since the First Iranian Constitution of 1906." LEGAL ASPECTS, supra
note 18, at 17.
29. Iran, in 3 THOMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORS, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT
SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION IN. JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD 1 (1993).
30. STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 23, at 778, ("Following widespread civil
unrest, the Shah left Iran on 17 Jan. 1979. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, spiritual leader
of the Shi'a Moslem community, returned from 15 years' exile on 1 Feb. 1979 and appointed
a provisional government on 5 Feb. An Islamic Republic was proclaimed on 1 Apr. 1979.").
The revolution occurred primarily in response to the repressive conditions that existed under
the Pahlavi Dynasty. Under the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi there was
continous abuse of human rights, and the Shah's U.S. trained secret police force, SAVAK,
wielded a great deal of power. Further, there was popular resistance to the Shah's accelerated
modernization program for Iran, which many felt threatened traditional Islamic values. For
more detailed accounts of the causes of the Iranian revolution, see generally HAMID DABASHI,
THEOLOGY OF DISCONTENT (1993); MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, IRAN: FROM RELIGIOUS DISPUTE
TO REVOLUTION (1980); NOORI & AMIN, supra note 16.
31. Zolan, supra note 21, at 183.
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as the primary sources of law. 32 The shari'a33 is an all-encompassing
code of regulations for Muslims in all areas of their lives, including
marriage, divorce, sexuality, and social relations.34
Article 4 of the Constitution declares the supremacy of the shari'a:
All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, mili-
tary, political and other laws and regulations must be based on
Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to
all articles of the Constitution, as well as to all laws and regula-
tions, and the fugaha or the Council of Guardians have the duty of
supervising its implementation.
35
Further, Article 72 of the Constitution prohibits the legislature from
enacting "laws contrary to the principles and ordinances of the official
religion of the country or to the Constitution. 36 The long Iranian tradi-
tion of having one supreme authority remains under the Islamic
Republic, and this position rests in the Spiritual Leader or faqih.37
32. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 18, at 17.
Iranian civil laws which were first ratified in 1928 with the establishment of a
modem judiciary system, following the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911,
are mainly based on the Islamic laws (sharia). Some parts, however, which have
been adapted from the French civil laws, are mainly to do with criminal law. The
laws regarding marriage, divorce, children's guardianship inheritance and in general
those dealing with the relationships between men and women, are all 'sharia' laws.
Farah Azari, Islam's Appeal to Women in Iran: Illusions and Reality, in WOMEN OF IRAN,
THE CONFLICT OF FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM 10 (F. Azari ed., 1983). For a general discussion
of the Constitution and government of the Islamic Republic, see POLITICAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 13, at 356-57; Mehrdad Haghayaghi, Politics and Ideology in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 29 MIDDLE E. STUD. 36 (1993).
33. Shari'a, alternatively referred to as sharia or shari'at, literally means "'the road to
the watering hole,' the clear, right, or straight path to be followed. In Islam, it came to mean
the divinely mandated path, the straight path of Islam, that Muslims were to follow, God's
will or law." ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 79.
34. Zolan, supra note 21, at 184. The shari'a "embraces all human activities. [It] is more
than just 'law' in its modern sense; it is a code of ethics and duties. Its tendency is toward a
religious evaluation of all human conduct." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 362. Further, "Mus-
lims revere the Shari'a in the same manner that western Europeans venerate Roman law."
Majid Khadduri, Marriage in Islamic Law: The Modernist Viewpoints, 26 AM. J. COMP. L.
213, 218 (1978). See also SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, IDEALS AND REALITIES OF ISLAM 93-120
(1988).
35. CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 29 (Hamid Algar trans., 1980)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
36. Id. at 55. This is enforced by the Council of Guardians which makes sure that
legislation is in accordance with the Islamic code and the Constitution. Id.
37. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic "gives supreme authority to the Spiritual
Leader (wali fagih), which position was held by Ayatollah Khomeini until his death on 3
June 1989. Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei was elected to succeed him on 4 June 1989."
STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 23, at 779.
Winter 1994)
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At the beginning of the revolution the legal system was in a state of
confusion. The revolutionary councils began to revise the previous
Iranian codes,38 incorporating many of the teachings and pronounce-
ments of Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the revolution, as
part of the law.39 At the present time, the state of the law is still in flux,
but the judicial system looks to the shari'a and Khomeini's pronounce-
ments as the primary sources of authority. Prior judicial decisions and
custom play a smaller role, although judges sometimes refer to them.
Further, judges also consider prerevolutionary laws where there is no
judicial precedent or postrevolutionary pronouncement.'
This brief account of Iranian history illustrates the pervasive role of
the government in the lives of the Iranian people. This characteristic can
be attributed to a tradition of absolute authority in a ruling head of State
and the government's incorporation of the shari'a, which enumerates
many rules of behavior, into Iranian laws. An in-depth discussion of this
feature of Iranian political history is beyond the scope of this Note. The
historical background simply provides some understanding of the ratio-
nale behind the current Islamic regime's promotion of temporary mar-
riages. Before embarking on a discussion of the details of temporary
marriages, the next Part traces the development of the role which Iranian
society accords women.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN VIEWS TOWARD WOMEN
Iran's political history has significantly affected the role of women
in Iran. In the years prior to the Islamic conquests, Iranian society gave
women high social standing and a large amount of liberty. The Zoroas-
trian influence in Iran was responsible for the enhanced role of women
in society: "[T]he pre-Islamic woman in Persia owned property, became
guardian of a minor, went to court to defend her rights, and ruled the
38. Amin states:
The Supreme Judicial Council, set up under the 1979 Constitution has taken upon
itself to revise the pre-revolution civil, commercial and penal codes .... The 1982
amendment to the 1927-1935 Civil Code are [sic] minimal, but the amendments to
the other laws, particularly in the criminal area, have fundamentally changed the
structure of the Iranian legal system.
LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 18, at 17-18.
39. The views of Ayatollah Khomeini "were, at first, to be 'transitional laws' until new
legislation was passed by the Majlis (Parliament). In practice, however, the Legal Treatise
written by the Ayatollah Khomeini to date remains as the major, but 'unofficial', statement of
law in Iran." Id. at 18. See also NoostI & AMIN, supra note 16, at 10.
40. AMIN, supra note 10, at 63; REYNOLDS & FLORS, supra note 29, at 2.
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empire.""' The status of women in Iran declined with the Islamic
conquests and with the adoption of Shi'a Islam as Iran's State religion.42
This change occurred despite the fact that in Islam, men and women
are considered equal in the eyes of God or Allah.43 It is generally be-
lieved that "Equality is the prevalent theme in the Qur'an. The Islamic
belief is that all people, regardless of gender and race, are equal in the
eyes of Allah, because they share a common origin."'
The Qur'an, however, promoted a change in women's status be-
cause it designated specific roles for men and women in society. Con-
sider verse IV.34, where the Qur'an states: "Men are the protectors And
maintainers of women, Because God has given The one more (strength)
Than the other, and because They support them From their means.
Therefore the righteous women Are devoutly obedient[.], '45 This verse
clearly places women in a subordinate position in relation to men by
41. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 364. The author states that, "[t]he Zoroastrian woman of
Iran were far more advanced socially and in reality suffered a setback with the introduction of
Islam into their society." Id. at 384. The Zoroastrian religion granted women high status
because of the "Zoroastrian myth that the male and female are created simultaneously and
equally out of plant life." Id. at 364. See also Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 255 ("During the
Mongol period, women held high political and social positions. But after Shi'ism was
declared the official religion by the Safavids in 1501 the status of women declined.");
MANECKJI NUSSERVANJI DHALLA, ZOROASTRIAN CIVILIZATION: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES
TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE LAST ZOROASTRIAN EMPIRE 651 A.D., at 74 (1922). Zorastrian
society elevated women to an equal status with men:
The position of woman, as we glean from the Avestan texts, was high indeed. The
works of the earliest period speak of her as the companion of man. She did not veil
herself, and attended social and religious gatherings in company with man.... At
home woman enjoyed economic freedom. She was a helpmate for her husband, and
wielded great influence over the family.
Id.; see also Shireen Mahdavi, Women and the Shii Ulama in Iran, 19 MIDDLE E. STUD. 17
(1983) [hereinafter Women and the Shii Ulama].
42. The lower status of women is not unique to Shi'a Islam:
Sunni and Shia ... perhaps have had more in common in their position on
women's rights and status than on any other major issue. Whether on the question
of female inheritance, marriage, divorce, children's 'custody, the veil, or other
issues, it is difficult to see if one faction grants more rights to women.
Azari, supra note 32, at 5.
43. Provisions in the Qur'an referring to the equal status of women and men include
verses IV.124 and IV.32. THE HOLY QUR'AN, S.IV.32, at 189, S.IV.124, at 219 (A. Yusuf Ali
trans., 1983). But for indications of unequal status between men and women, see in id.
S.I1.228, at 90.
44. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 384. In contrast to Christianity and Judaism, Islam views
women more positively. For example, the Qur'an does not blame Eve for Adam's fall from
Eden: "Woman is not portrayed as the cause of the Fall, as in Judeo-Christian traditions.
Moreover, the sin of Adam and Eve is just that - their own personal sin." ESPOSITO, supra
note 6, at 31. See also MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 146-52.
45. THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.IV.34, at 190.
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giving men authority over women. It is but one of many passages in the
Qur'an which differentiates between the sexes and grants women lower
status or lesser rights. For example, traditional Islamic scholars interpret
the Qur'an to allow men the right to marry up to four women,46 the
right to a unilateral declaration of divorce,47 and the right to a greater
level of inheritance than women.48 Women may only marry one man at
a time and have limited divorce and inheritance rights.49
These verses alone do not subjugate women. Rather, men's interpre-
tation of the Qur'anic rules has resulted in women's subordination in
both Shi'a and Sunni societies: "In spite of some generalized statements
in the Koran about sexual equality, women in Islam were subjugated
and regarded as inferior beings .... This is because the legal interpreters
of Islam were primarily men, and prophecy, leadership in public prayer,
and saintship were in general reserved for men."5
Islamic theologians and scholars claim that Islam has greatly im-
proved the status of women from that which existed in prelslamic
Arabia.51 To some extent this assertion appears valid. For example,
Islam outlawed the practice of female infanticide, gave women the right
to own property, and limited the practice of the taking of an unlimited
number of wives.52 However, even with these reforms, disparities still
exist between the rights Islam accords to men and women. These
46. S.IV.3, in id. at 179. Commentators disagree as to whether the Qur'an, in fact,
sanctions polygamy. Mahdavi states:
There is no justification for polygamy in the Koran but the interpreters do so in
terms of shortage of men, orphans and the female's need for sex. Another
justification for polygamy is that it is better to formalize the male's polygamous
desires than to force him to have extra-marital sex as in the West.
Women and the Shii Ulama, supra note 41, at 21.
47. THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.11.226-37, at 89-95.
48. S.IV.11, in id. at 181.
49. Women and the Shii Ulama, supra note 41, at 18. "The Muslim society is a male
dominated society. There is detailed legislation on family life in the Qur'an dealing with
marriage, divorce, and inheritance and almost all of them favoring men." Honarvar, supra
note 16, at 365. For a contemporary reinterpretation of these verses, see generally ABDULLAHI
AHMED AN'NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
50. VERN L. BULLOUGH ET AL., THE SUBORDINATED SEX: A HISTORY OF ATTITUDES
TOWARD WOMEN 113 (1988). The Qur'an "says a great deal about the position of women but
much of it has been interpreted in such as way as to become socially restraining and to justify
men's rights and superior position." Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 258.
51. ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 95-96, 97 (stating that "similar legal rights would not
occur in the West until the nineteenth century."); ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM & HUMAN RIGHTS
110-11 (1991); NOORI & AMIN, supra note 16, at 61; 'ABDu RAHMAN 1. Doi, WOMEN IN
SHARI'AH (ISLAMIC LAW) 5 (1990).
52. See infra note 89-90 and accompanying text.
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discrepancies are testimony to the continued subordinate status of
women in Islam. It should also be noted that any rise in the status of
Arabic women after Islam was met with a corresponding decrease in the
status of Iranian women. That is, even if the rights and status of Arabic
women were increased, the rights and privileges which women enjoyed
in preIslamic Iran disappeared with the advent of Islam.
Fundamentalist Islamic ideologists would disagree, contending that
Islam accords women a very special role and, in fact, reveres women.
Islamic societies consider the family unit to be of central importance,
and the mother is considered the base of this unit. The mother's role is
therefore essential in raising children and providing for family needs.53
The significance of this function for Iranian society as a whole is that
the mother is to be revered54 and protected by the male members of the
household.
The traditional rationale behind this role differentiation between the
sexes lies in the natural differences that Islamic scholars perceive to
exist between men and women.55 Women are perceived to be better
suited to the tasks of raising and educating children and dealing with
personal problems because of, their more emotional and sensitive
natures.56 In contrast, scholars believe that men are both physically and
mentally more capable of protecting and financially providing for the
family.
Shi'a theologians57 reaffirmed traditional Islamic views on male and
female roles by positing both psychological and physiological reasons
for the different status of men and women. For example, a prominent
53. From Muslim theologians and fundamentalists "we learn that the role of Muslim
women centers around childbearing and child rearing, educating children and inculcating them
with Muslim precepts." Madelain Farah, Introduction to MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY IN
ISLAM; A TRANSLATION OF AL-GHAZALI'S BOOK ON THE ETIQUETTE OF MARRIAGE FROM THE
IHYA 5 (Madelain Farah trans., 1984). The religion "places the husband as the head of the
household and its provider. While not disallowing a woman to work outside her home, it
(Islam) clearly states that a woman's primary functions in life are to: bear children, provide a
loving home for her family, and obey her husband's orders." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 382.
54. See THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.IV.l, at 178.
55. HAERI, supra note 6, at 4 ("[Nlature imprints men and women fundamentally,
differently, and inescapably.").
56. Anne H. Betteridge, The Controversial Vows of Urban Muslim Women in Iran, in
UNSPOKEN WORLDS: WOMEN'S RELIGIOUS LIVES IN NON-WESTERN CULTURES 141, 144
(Nancy Auer Falk & Rita M. Gross eds., 1980).
57. In Iran, "the most prominent contemporary interpreters of the Shia position on
women have been three 'ulama, or muJtahids: 'Allamah Tabataba'i, 'Allamah Nuri, and
Ayatullah Mutahhiri." Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 257. Betteridge describes a mujtahid as
"one learned in religious sciences whose learning and abilities have been formally recognized
and certified by the Shi'ite religious leaders ('ulama) of the time. A mujtahid is unique in
having the right to make independent decisions in the interpretation of religious law."
Betteridge, supra note 56, at 155 n.2.
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Shi'a theologian, 'Allamah Nuri accounted for the superiority of males
over females by pointing to
physiological differences between men and women such as the size
of the heart, the weight of the brain, and the size of the skull. The
psychological differences, according to him, are that women are
affectionate and emotional and have weaker nerves. Men, however,
are wise and intellectual and have strong nerves, which make them
more qualified to strive, struggle, and campaign against the odds of
everyday life.58
Historically, Iranian theologians have utilized these perceived
differences to exclude women from certain professionsi 9 The judicial
system traditionally relied on these same differences to limit women's
right to divorce' and to justify submitting women to the authority of
their male guardians, whether it be the woman's father or her husband.6'
58. Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 259. Further, "[w]omen are also viewed as being more
sensitive and emotional than men, who are more rational in their approach and are thus
considered better suited to make major decisions both inside and outside the home." Zolan,
supra note 21, at 185. For Ayatollah Motaheri's views with regard to the differences between
men and women, see MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 199-222; Azari, supra note 32, at 17-21. It
is because of these believed biological differences in women that Islamic theologians deny
them the opportunity of becoming mujtahids, or religious interpreters and leaders. See
Michael M.J. Fischer, On Changing the Concept and Position of Persian Women, in WOMEN
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 1, at 189, 195. Of course, Islamic scholars are not the
only ones who have made such characterizations of men and women. For similar comparisons
in U.S. law, see Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 139-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
59. Farah Azari elaborates:
The ideology that justifies discriminatory laws against women in Muslim society is
derived from a belief in the unequal creation of women and the difference in their
nature to men. Mental and physical differences and 'deficiencies' are quoted as the
basis for social differences as are limitations in their reasoning powers and their
generally weaker intellectual faculties altogether. These, combined with their
excessive emotionality, are taken to be attributes that disqualify them from partici-
pating in the legal profession, in politics, in the armed forces, and in general in any
job that will give women a say in running the society.
Azari, supra note 32, at 16.
60. In Islam, divorce is highly discouraged because it disrupts the family unit, which lies
at the base of society. It does not "carry an immoral connotation. However, Islam strongly
discourages the right to exercise divorce on frivolous and unimportant grounds because
frequent use of divorce destroys the family unit." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 371. Muslim
theologians do not feel that women, because of their perceived emotional nature and some-
what irrational tendencies, should be completely free to make this decision. Men, of course,
are free to pursue a divorce. One Islamic scholar justifies denying women the right to divorce
by pointing to women's psychological and physiological constitution. He argues that menstru-
ation affects women's mental and physical attributes; additionally, he posits, women are
impressionable, susceptable to suggestion, and lack self-control. He states: "If women were
given the power of unilateral divorce, it is possible that millions of them would divorce their
husbands and it is probable that millions of divorces would have ensued and there would be
chaos in society." Dol, supra note 51, at 95.
61. Traditional Islamic theologians believe that
[o]n earth, where God had made man superior to woman, women were to be
subject to their nearest male relative, whose right over them was similar to his right
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Both traditional Islamic thinkers and Shi'a ideologians have cited
the importance of the family unit as a rationale for other restrictions on
women, and they have justified these practices by referring to the natu-
ral differences between males and females. The scholars viewed women
as natural sexual temptresses,62 while viewing men as having uncontrol-
lable sexual desires.63 In order to curb men's insatiable sexual appetite,
Islamic theologians advocate that women should be veiled or secluded
so that men will not be tempted by women into engaging in extramarital
sexual relations.' Furthermore, in order to satisfy men's sexual desires
Islamic scholars have allowed polygamy65 and the Shi'a scholars, in
particular, have advocated that men engage in temporary marriages.'
over any of his other property. In Islamic tradition the wife's honor was in the
hands of her husband, and it was his business to see that she was not violated.
BULLOUGH ET AL., supra note 50, at 117.
62. The traditionalists view of women "as creatures in need of security and protection,
and are also viewed as being sexually dangerous because they use their sexuality to attract
and lure men." Zolan, supra note 21, at 186.
63. Mahdavi states:
The primary assumption is that men and women are not equal because they are
biologically different. The biological differences affect both sexual needs and
mental ability .... Men are rational; women are emotional. In practice, these
differences lead to divisions in work, needs, and social life. Women are seen as a
disturbing element to men in their conduct of everyday life. This causes difficulty,
because the male's sexual desire is seen as uncontrollable.
Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 258.
64. The practice of veiling in Islam is based on verse XXIV.31 of the Qur'an, which
states:
And say to the believing women
That they should lower
Their gaze and guard
Their modesty; that they
Should not display their
Beauty and ornaments except
What (must ordinarily) appear
Draw their veils over
Their bosoms and not display
Their beauty except
To their husbands, their fathers,
Their husband's father, their sons ...
THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, at 904-05. Commentators believe that "[a] woman's
Islamic garb reduces sexual tension in public places, frees her from the competition of being
sexually appealing, negates her image as a sex object, and attenuates differences in wealth
and/or physical attractiveness." Mostafa Hashem Sherif, What is Hijab?, LXXVII MUSLIM
WORLD 151, 153 (1987). Other scholars believe that the veil was a prelslamic practice and
that the Qur'an does not specifically mandate veiling. See generally id.; ESPOSiTO, supra note
6, at 100-01.
65. See Doi, supra note 51, at 52, regarding one Islamic scholar's views about examples
of situations for which polygamy is seen as the "best solution." Examples include when the
wife is suffering from a serious disease, cannot bear children, or is of unsound mind. Id.
66. Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 258; Farah Azari, Sexuality and Women's Oppression in
Iran, in WOMEN OF IRAN 90, 113 (1983) [hereinafter Sexuality and Women's Oppression].
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These traditional Islamic beliefs with respect to the role and nature
of women became part of the shari'a, and they dominated Iranian
society by their incorporation in the civil laws. In 1967, however,
Mohammed Reza, Shah Pahlavi promoted the enactment of the Family
Protection Act. 67 This was an attempt by the regime to shift away from
the shari'a and to increase the rights of women. Although the
government did not outlaw temporary marriages, 8 it instituted various
other reforms with the Act and its subsequent amendments, 69 such as:
(1) establishing special family courts to hear divorce and child custody
cases; (2) allowing women the right to sue for divorce and limiting the
traditional rights held by men; 70 (3) raising the minimum age for
marriage for women from fifteen to eighteen and from -eighteen to
twenty for men; (4) legalizing abortions; (5) establishing family
planning centers; and (6) curtailing the right of men to have multiple
marriages. 71 The reforms under the Pahlavi Dynasty had also allowed
women to participate in education, employment, and suffrage.72
The restoration of the shari'a, however, following the Islamic
revolution, reversed the gains women had made in improving their
status. 73 Article 20 of the Constitution accords women equality with
67. For a general discussion of the Family Protection Act, see Introduction to FAMILY
LAWS OF IRAN 8 (Sayyid Ali Reza Naqavi trans., 1971). The full text of the Act is available
in id. at 66.
68. The Iranian Civil Code contained provisions regulating temporary marriages: "A
marriage is temporary when it is contracted for a specified period." Civil Code § 1075, in id.
at 30. "The period of a temporary marriage must be expressly specified." Civil Code § 1076,
in id.
69. Haleh E. Bakhash, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 1985, at 15; Zolan, supra note 21, at
191; Azari, supra note 32, at 15.
70. Introduction to FAMILY LAWS OF IRAN, supra note 67, at 11. Farah Azari states that:
The major achievement of the Act was in divorce. It removed the unconditional
right of a man to divorce and made it subject to approval by the family protection
court, so that a man and a woman both had almost equal rights in applying to the
courts which were established all over the country for a certificate of
incompatibility.
Azari, supra note 32, at 13. The Act, however, did not guarantee such a right since all
judgments had to be approved by a cleric.
71. The Act "allows a husband, already having a wife, to marry another woman,
provided he has obtained a permission for this purpose from the court." Introduction to
FAMILY LAWS OF IRAN, supra note 67, at 8.
72. Women and the Shii Ulama, supra note 41, at 17; Fischer, supra note 58, at 191
("Today, there are few areas excluded to women: aside from an activist queen, there have
been two women cabinet ministers, a number of senators and Majlis representatives, mayors,
city councillors, writers, architects, lawyers, doctors, senior civil servants, journalists, and
university professors.").
73. The regime under the Shah "had accomplished major improvements in the area of
women's rights vis-a-vis the family, most of which have been repudiated by Khomeni."
Zolan, supra note 21, at 190. See Afshar, supra note 8, at 70-71. Women had made many
gains before the current regime came to power:
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men, stating that "All citizens of the nation, both women and men,
equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic
criteria."74 Nonetheless, the equality granted women in the Constitution
is subject to the shari'a, which theologians have traditionally used to
limit women's rights. In fact,
[w]ithin weeks of the revolution, Khomeini ordered that all women
wear the Islamic headdress. The Family Protection Law was an-
nulled. The minimum age of marriage was reduced to 15 for girls,
and courts allowed families dispensation to marry off daughters as
young as ten years old. Polygamy again became legal, and tempo-
71rary marriages have become common.
The regime stressed the traditional role of the woman as the mother
and caregiver:
The family is the fundamental unit of society and the major center
for the growth and advancement of man .... This view of the
family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as
an instrument in the service of consumerism and exploitation. Not
only does woman recover thereby her momentous and precious
function of motherhood, rearing alert and active human beings, she
also becomes the fellow struggler of man in all the different areas
of life. Given the weighty responsibilities that woman thus
assumes, she is accorded in Islam great value and nobility.76
[D]uring the 80 years preceding the Islamic revolution, Iranian women fought for
and gained access to education (1910), the abolition of the veil (1936), the vote
(1962), and a curb on the unequivocal male right of divorce and the right to contest
for the custody of children (1973), free abortion on demand (1974), and a ban on
polygamy and the right to maintenance after divorce (1976).
Id.
74. CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 36 (emphasis added). The Constitution provides for
women's rights, provided that such rights do not run counter to Islamic policy. Article 21
states:
The government must assure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity
with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals: a. create a favorable
environment for the growth of woman's personality and the restoration of her
rights, tangible and intangible; b. the protection of mothers, particularly during
pregnancy and childrearing, and the protection of children without guardians; c. the
creation of a competent court to protect and preserve the family; d. the provision of
special insurance for widows and aged and destitute women; e. the granting of
guardianship of children to their mothers whenever suitable in order to protect the
interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian.
Id. at 36-37.
75. Bakhash, supra note 69; See also Zolan, supra note 21, at 191.
76. Introduction, in CoNsTITuTIoN, supra note 35, at 22. Zolan states:
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Once again, this relegation of women to their traditional role has
resulted in the practices of secluding women,77 mandatory veiling,78
polygamy,79 and temporary marriages.80 A scholar has characterized the
current situation as follows:
The Islamic Republic in Iran has created two classes of citizen: the
male who benefits from the provisions of Islamic law and justice
and the female who does not. With the sole exception of the right
to vote, Iranian women are in all other respects formally recog-
nized as second-class citizens who have no place in the public
arena and no security in the domestic sphere The husband has
The views of Ayatollah Khomeini and other influential Islamic leaders regarding
the true nature of women indicate that they feel that the role of wife and mother is
what women are best suited for .... The belief regarding the proper role for
women in Iranian society can be traced to the view held by Islamic leaders that the
division of labor in society should be gender-based due to the innate differences
between men and women which are in keeping with the command of God as
revealed in the sharia.
Zolan, supra note 21, at 185.
77. The clerics have excluded women by limiting their educational and employment
opportunities.
For example, as a result of the belief regarding the inherent emotionality and lack
of intellectual ability of women, traditional elements argued that women should be
banned from occupying judicial positions. Hence, female judges were dismissed
from their positions, barred from practice, and told to look for 'clerical and admin-
istrative posts' in the judiciary.
Zolan, supra note 21, at 189 (citations omitted). In addition, "[w]omen can become physi-
cians, but they are barred from studying mechanics or electrical engineering." Further,
"[w]omen may not pursue advanced degrees outside Iran if they are single." Nora Boustany,
In Iran, the Chador has Begun to Chafe; With Little Organized Help, Women Seek to Wrest
their Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al. Also, "since 1979, female participation in
most areas of government has been banned, with most working women serving as unpaid
agricultural laborers on family landholdings." POLITICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 354.
Ann Mayer states that women's exclusion from the legal profession has "deliberately exclud-
ed [them] from having a say in the legal order that assigns them an inferior status or from
assuming positions where they might challenge the Islamic pedigree of the regime's discrimi-
natory laws." MAYER, supra note 51, at 131. For a concise analysis of the employment
opportunities for women in the Islamic Republic, see Val Moghadam, Women, Work, and
Ideology in the Islamic Republic, 20 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 221-43 (1988).
78. In Iran, the government has officially mandated that women wear the hejab, or veil.
The law mandates "that a woman's head must be covered 'except for the oval of her face and
that her entire body be covered except for the hands up to the wrist."' Zolan, supra note 21,
at 189 (citation omitted). Muslim theologians argue that veiling has raised the status of
women because once "the Muslim woman is veiled, she can be treated as a person and not
merely as a sex object[.]" Fischer, supra note 58, at 196. See also Judith Miller, Women
Regain a Kind of Security in Islam's Embrace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at E6 ("Wearing
the hijab lets women move about the city unmolested and unharassed by the young men and
teen-age boys who have poured into the capital from the countryside in search of work. It
sends an unmistakable signal to every male: This is a devout woman. Leave her alone.").
79. See supra note 75.
80. Id.
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become an absolute ruler, entitled to exercise the power of life and
death in his home.8
This analysis of the role of women in Iranian society illustrates their
precarious position. Their rights are consistently subject to Shi'a inter-
pretations of both Islamic rules and the shari'a, interpretations which
have resulted in women having lesser rights and lower status. Some
commentators believe that, as will be shown in the following discussion,
the institution of temporary marriages reaffirms these traditional Shi'a
interpretations. In the next Part, the Note will initiate an analysis of this
institution, and in Part V, the Note will evaluate its merits.
III. TEMPORARY MARRIAGES IN IRAN
The Shi'a sect of Islam recognizes three forms of marriage: (1) per-
manent marriage or nikah;82 (2) temporary marriage, known as mut'a or
sigheh;83 and (3) slave marriage or nikah ul-ima.84 The Iranian Civil
Code recognizes the permanent and the temporary forms of marriage, 5
and these two types of marriage are the focus of this Note. The law has
always permitted temporary marriages in Iran, although they are socially
81. Afshar, supra note 8, at 83. Mayer reaffirms this analysis:
The record, therefore, overwhelmingly establishes that Islamic principles, Islamic
law, and Islamic morality have been interpreted in Iran to justify depriving women
of any semblance of equality with men, subjecting them to a wide range of dis-
criminatory laws and treatment, and effectively confining them to serving their
husbands, performing domestic tasks, and bearing and raising children.
MAYER, supra note 51, at 132.
82. Nikah marriage "literally meant sexual intercourse, although it was also used in the
Koran to mean contract." BULLOUGH ET AL., supra note 50, at 118.
83. Mui'a is an Arabic term meaning: "(a) 'that which gives benefits, but for a short
while'; (b) 'enjoyment,' 'pleasure, i.e., to saturate'; and (c) 'to have the usufruct of some-
thing[.]"' HAERI, supra note 6, at 50 (citation omitted). The Persian term for mut'a is sigheh,
?which denotes both the form of the marriage contract and the woman who becomes the
'temporary' wife in such contracts." Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 125.
84. See HAERI, supra note 6, at 30.
85. Albert Bernardi, Iran: Family Law After the Islamic Revolution, 25 J. FAM. L. 151,
151 (1986-87) (citing article 1075 of Iranian Civil Code). Both marriages are also sanctioned
in the writings of the Ayatollah Khomeini:
By means of a marriage contract, a woman becomes lawful to a man and this may
be in two forms, permanent and nonpermanent. The permanent contract is that in
which the duration of matrimony is not specified and the woman who is contracted
for in this form is called "permanent," and the nonpermanent contract is that in
which the duration of matrimony is specified; for example, the woman is contracted
for a period of one hour or one day or one month or one year or more, and the
woman who is contracted for in this form is called "mot'e" or "sigheh."
TAUZI-H-OLMASAEL-E HAZRAT IMAN KHOMEINI GHODS-E SAREH 410 (4th ed. 1992) (translat-
ed by author) [hereinafter KHOMEINI].
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frowned upon. The current Islamic regime, as will be discussed in Part
V, has been promoting the use of the temporary marriages despite Irani-
ans' general disapproval of the institution.86 The regime "has made an
orchestrated effort to educate the public of the specifics of the institu-
tion, its divine roots, its contemporary relevance, emphasizing its posi-
tive effects for the individual and social moral health." 7
This Part of the Note describes the institution of temporary marriag-
es in Iran. The first Section sets out the basis for this discussion, de-
scribing the institution of marriage in Islam, as well as its characteristics
and significance. Next, the Note discusses the characteristics of actual
marriages and outlines the limitations Islam places on them. The third
Section describes temporary marriages by contrasting them to permanent
marriages.
A. Marriage in Islam
In both Shi'a and Sunni Islam, marriage is a sacred institution and is
often cited as a mandate for every individual. In contrast to early Chris-
tianity, which "considered marriage good but celibacy better, Islam
accepted marriage as the highest good, ordaified by God: 'He created for
you helpmeets from yourselves that ye. might find rest in them, and He
ordained between you love and mercy. Lo, herein indeed are potents for
folk who reflect.' '"88
The marriage rules designated by the Prophet Muhammad were
designed to reform the immoral and paganistic practices that existed in
prelslamic Arabia:
Historians allege that the societal conditions, at least for the one
hundred years immediately preceding the advent of Islam, had
deteriorated considerably. They claim the condition of women at
the time of the Prophet differed very little from that of animals.
Women had no legal rights, polygamy was a common practice,
divorce was easily obtained, and female infanticide was an
everyday occurrence. s9
86. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
87. HAERI, supra note 6, at 7. Following the revolution, "the Islamic regime embarked
on an intensive campaign to revitalize temporary marriage .... The objective was to 'purify'
the institution of some of its negative cultural connotations and moral stigmatization[.]" Id. at
96.
88. BULLOUGH ET AL., supra note 50, at 116 (citation omitted). Islam reveres the
institution of marriage because it is believed that marriage "is the cornerstone of the Islamic
culture. It is an institution ordained for the protection of society and its members from
foulness and unchastity." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 365.
89. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 366.
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Islam reformed these conditions by granting women legal rights, limit-
ing polygamy, reducing the ability. of individuals to obtain a divorce,
and outlawing female infanticide. 9°
Furthermore, law, religion, and society each gives marriage special
significance in Iran. In law, as will be discussed below, marriage is a
contract between the husband and wife and creates rights and responsi-
bilities between the parties. 9' In religion, "marriage as an institution
leads to the uplift of man and is a means for the continuance of the
human race."92 Finally, in society, marriage has importance because the
culture considers married women to have high social standing and
reveres them because of their role as mothers. The designation of vari-
ous rules and limitations maintains the significance of marriage in Islam.
B. Characteristics of Marriage in Islam
In Islam, marriage is considered a contract between a man and a
woman. Therefore, the personal relationship between individuals, as is
the case in relationships between individuals undertaking a commercial
venture, is governed by Islamic contract law and is "subject to the same
regulations as other contracts [.]
' 93
Marriage contracts are initially subject to two requirements: First,
for a marriage contract to be valid a certain number of witnesses are re-
quired; second, "like all forms of Islamic contracts, [the marriage con-
tract] requires an act of offer and acceptance made in the same session.
An act of 'offer' involves uttering a ritualistic formula by the woman,
and 'acceptance' involves a similar formulaic reply by the husband." 94
90. The Prophet's teachings included:
reforms of existing social practices and injunctions for the abolition of infanticide,
for protection of widows and orphans, and for the limitation of polygamy. The
marriage contract included rights and obligations for both husband and wife,
granted a marriage dowry to the woman, and contained inheritance rights for the
woman.
Farah, supra note 53, at 10-11. See also Khadduri, supra note 34, at 213.
91. "Marriage in Islam is regarded as a contract because it is based on the mutual
consent of both man and woman and because it is dissoluble when the rights and duties,
which are fixed by law, are not met." Farah, supra note 53, at 11.
92. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 368.
93. The Arabic word for contract is 'aqd, which is also the Persian word for the official
marriage ceremony. S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 87 (1991).
See Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 125. Marriage in Islam is regarded as a contract because
"it 1) requires a proposal and a consent, 2) allows provisions for its breach, and 3) permits
revisions or modifications to suit each individual case." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 367.
94. HAERI, supra note 6, at 36. The acts of offer and accepatance "must convey an
unequivocal intention that the parties intend to become husband and wife." RAYNER, supra
note 93, at 165. Ayatollah Khomeini argues, however, that it is not enough that the parties
express their intent to be bound. It is necessary for the marriage formula to be pronounced,
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These requirements are intended to reinforce the belief that the contract
was freely and mutually agreed upon by the parties.95 Furthermore,
"[a]lthough an offer to marry is actually made through a woman's
father, the woman's consent is considered imperative if the contract is to
be binding.
96
In marriage, as with other contracts, there is little liberty of contract
in Islamic law. Although "'Islamic law does not recognize the liberty of
contract, [] it provides an appreciable measure of freedom within fixed
types. . .' Freedom within fixed types of contracts means inserting
mutually agreeable clauses in the contract[.]" 97 However, in Iran men
and women negotiate marriage contracts from unequal bargaining posi-
tions because of the higher status the male holds in Iranian society.
Given this disparity, women cannot, as a practical matter, negotiate for
contract clauses which benefit them.98
An integral part of the Islamic marriage contract is the brideprice or
mahr.99 The mahr is traditionally the subject of negotiation between the
parents of the bride and groom. It is a certain amount of money that the
groom intends to give to the bride herself for the marriage.1°° Usually,
this money is not actually given to the bride unless the couple decides
to divorce. It is given then so that the woman will be financially secure
after the marriage is over, when her husband no longer provides for her.
The element of brideprice has caused some commentators to liken
the Islamic marriage contract to a contract for sale. The brideprice is
but this can be done by the parties themselves. KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2371, at
410.
95. "Marriage was considered as a contract between two 'freely consenting adults' who,
within bounds are free to set their own terms on it. The question of being 'free' though is
only relative for a woman, first marriage being subject to approval by her father or the
paternal grandfather, regardless of her age." Azari, supra note 32, at 11. See also Honarvar,
supra note 16, at 367.
96. Khadduri, supra note 34, at 213.
97. HAERI, supra note 6, at 31 (citation omitted).
98. Haeri believes that "[w]hat is lacking in such masculine Shi'i reasoning is the fact
that men and women negotiate from a position of inequality: legally, economically, psycho-
logically, or socially." Id. at 202.
99. Farah, supra note 53, at 14. Mahr is an Arabic term. It can never be eliminated from
the marriage contract. HAERI, supra note 6, at 34. Nasir states that "[t]he Shias maintain that
if the husband makes a condition in the marriage contract that he shall pay no dower, this
condition shall be null and void, but the contract shall remain valid." NASIR, supra note 5, at
87. Islam, however, is not unique in requiring a brideprice. Fischer argues that both the
Jewish and Zoroastrian religions in Iran have provisions in their marriages similar to the
mahr. Fischer, supra note 58, at 198-201. For Ayatollah Motaheri's views regarding the
mahr, see MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 225-74.
100. Usually, the more wealthy the bride and the better her attributes and family connec-
tions, the higher will be her brideprice. The brideprice therefore reflects what the groom and
his family consider the bride to be worth.
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perceived to be the consideration given for the object of the sale, the
woman.'' In fact, a contemporary Muslim scholar has been quoted as
"giving several interpretations of the term nikah, [and] conclud[ing] that
'nikah is a contract for the ownership, tamlik, of the use of [the]
vagina."102
Islam places additional limitations on marriages which are consistent
with their legal, religious, and social role. It outlawed the widespread
practice of polygamy that existed prior to the advent of the religion.
Islamic theologians only later interpreted the Qur'an to permit men to
marry up to four wives.10 3 Women, however, may not have more than
one husband. The man's right to multiple marriages, though, is limited
both practically and socially. Not only are multiple marriages socially
frowned upon, but they are also practically impossible. If a man wishes
to marry more than one woman, the Qur'an states that he must treat
them all equally in every respect. 1°4 This requirement can be a great
financial and physical burden and therefore a large deterrent to polyga-
mous relationships.
A second religious constraint on marriages concerns relationships
between individuals of differing faiths.105 Islam permits marriage among
101. Haeri characterizes the submission of brideprice as "[tihe most essential component
of a marriage contract .... In exchange, the husband gains a legitimate ownership right over
the object of sale, which in this case is his wife's sexual and reproductive organ." HABRI,
supra note 6, at 36-37. Haeri further contends that "many of the ulama argue that paying
something to the wife, no matter how small, is religiously meritorious, for 'it legitimizes the
intercourse'." Id. at 37 (quoting Tusi). But see Doi, supra note 51, at 154-56 (praising the
mahr). Doi suggests that "Islam has elevated the status of women, as mahr is given as a mark
of respect for her." Id. at 155.
102. HAERI, supra note 6, at 34 (quoting Jabiri-Arablu). Haeri further illustrates the
comparison:
Hilli provides an example again; though on the one hand he writes that nikah is a
'sort of ownership' and that it is 'similar to a [contract of] sale,' on the other hand
he emphasizes that 'the purpose of the exchange of vagina, 'mu'avizih-i buz', is
reproduction and recreation, and not just financial exchange.
Id (citation omitted).
103. THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.IV.3, at 179. In case "a man having four
wives marr[ies] a fifth wife, the marriage is not void, but is considered irregular. Such
marriage, although not wholly within the legal bounds, is recognized for the purpose of
legitimization of the children and the rights to inheritance." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 369.
See supra note 46.
104. The Qur'an states: "But if ye fear that ye shall not Be able to deal justly (with
them), Then only one[.]" THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.IV.3, at 179. "A woman may
not marry more than one man at a time so that paternity be known; a man may marry more
than one woman but only if he can treat them equally." Fischer, supra note 58, at 194-95.
105. The Qur'an warns: "Do not marry Unbelieving women (idolaters), Until they
believe: A slave woman who believes Is better than an unbelieving woman, Even though she
allure you. Nor marry (your girls) To unbelievers until They believe[.]" THE HOLY QUR'AN,
supra note 43, S.II.221, at 87.
Winter 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
individuals of differing Islamic sects; however, limitations exist on
individuals who seek to marry nonMuslims: "A Muslim man may marry
any non-Muslim except an idolatress or a fire-worshipper and have a
sahih, or valid marriage. However, a Muslim woman is strictly forbid-
den from marrying a non-Muslim."'"'°
A third limitation on Muslim marriages is that women must wait a
certain period of time after a marriage before they may remarry. 0 7 This
"is known as 'idda and it is roughly four months, unless the woman is
pregnant, in which case the period lasts until delivery."'0 8 The waiting
period is necessary because it will ensure that the paternity of any child
conceived before this period is certain."° Further, Islam also prohibits
marriage between individuals 'of close relation to each other." This
limitation is discussed in greater detail in Part V.2.
Islamic scholars believe that these religious characteristics of Islamic
marriage contracts improve the marriage institution and increase wom-
en's rights in marriage. However, the rules still explicitly favor men,
who may have multiple wives and may marry nonMuslims, while wom-
en cannot do the same. Furthermore, social realities limit the effect of
these reforms; women lack the bargaining power to negotiate beneficial
contract terms and sometimes must also give up their brideprice in order
to obtain a divorce."' The-next Section explores in greater detail the
temporary marriage contract to illustrate that such contracts typically
contain even fewer rights for the bride than their permanent counter-
parts.
106. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 370. For an explanation of the ban on Muslim women
from marrying nonMuslims, see Doi, supra note 51, at 47-48.
107. The Qur'an states: "Divorced women Shall wait concerning themselves For three
monthly periods." THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.II.228, at 89-90. Furthermore, "If
any of you die And leave widows behind, They shall wait concerning themselves Four
months and ten days ...." S.11.234, in id. at 93-94. See also MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 57.
108. Honarvar, supra note 16, at 370.
109. NASIR, supra note 5, at 146.
110. The Qur'an states:
Prohibited to you (For marriage) are: - Your mothers, daughters, Sisters; father's
sisters, Mother's sisters; brother's daughters, Sister's daughters; foster-mothers
(Who gave you suck), foster-sisters; Your wives' mothers; Your step-daughters
under your Guardianship, born of your wives To whom ye have gone in, - No
prohibition if ye have not gone in; - (Those who have been) Wives of your sons
proceeding From your loins; And two sisters in wedlock At one and the same time,
Except for what is past; For God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. ...
THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 43, S.IV.23, at 186; see Doi, supra note 51, at 36-39.
111. See infra notes 134-35.
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C. Temporary versus Permanent Marriages
Although Shi'a Islam considers both permanent and temporary
marriages to be contracts, there are significant differences between the
two types of marriages. This Section analyzes three components that are
integral to contracting into a temporary marriage. It also analyzes other
differences between temporary and permanent marriages such as the
rights and responsibilities inherent in the different types of marriage.
There are three components of temporary marriages that will serve
as the initial basis of comparison with permanent marriages: (1) the
legal form of the contract; (2) the duration of the term of marriage; and
(3) the consideration for the marriage.
To be valid, the temporary marriage must have the legal form of a
contract. "[L]ike any other contract in Islam, it requires an act of offer,
ijab, made by the woman, and acceptance, gabul, made by the man."
' 12
However, the temporary marriage is less formalistic than the permanent
marriage, and the parties themselves may perform the acts of contractual
formation and the marriage ceremony." t3 Further, the mut'a marriage
does not require witnesses as to its formation, nor is it required that the
contract be registered."14 As long as both individuals voluntarily contract
to enter the marriage and are aware of the terms of the contract, it will
be valid." 5 The parties are relatively autonomous in negotiating the
terms of the contract, if the terms do not contravene the shari'a.
The second component that is important in a temporary marriage is
its duration. The mut'a contract must state the precise duration of the
marriage term, which can range from one hour to ninety-nine years. The
time period, or ajal, "that a mut'a marriage shall last must be made
quantifiably clear .... [flor that matter, one cannot designate one's life-
time as the length of a mut'a marriage because this timing is impre-
cise."'"16 In fact, "[omitting] mention of duration can make the contract a
permanent one."'"17 However, some commentators believe that this
112. HAERI, supra note 6, at 51.
113. See KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2377, at 411.
114. HAERI, supra note 6, at 2.
115. Id. at 52. See also MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 56-57 (indicating that the parties
have more liberty in temporary marriages because of the greater flexibility of the contract
terms which the parties can employ); KHOMEINI, supra note 85, at 305.
116. HAERI, supra note 6, at 52. Haeri states that "specifying the number of occasions of
intercourse, jama', such as 'once or twice,' is not acceptable because the timing is indetermi-
nate and imprecise." Id. at 53.
117. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 126.
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simply invalidates the contract. The duration specified determines the
end of the contract, and therefore, there need be no provision for di-
vorce. However, the recision or a unilateral termination by the tempo-
rary husband can also terminate the contract.1
8
A third component of the mut'a marriage contract is that it must
state the consideration to be paid by the husband to the wife. This is
comparable to the mahr paid to the bride in the permanent marriage.
However, the consideration paid in a mut'a marriage is generally less
than that in a nikah marriage, and it is usually paid before consumma-
tion of the marriage. The temporary marriage payment, or ajr, "must be
of measurable quality and unambiguous" and "failure to specify the
amount of consideration, air, renders the contract invalid[.]"
119
As earlier stated, because of the brideprice in the contract for perma-
nent marriage, that type of marriage contract is similar to a contract for
sale. Because of the requirements of mut'a marriage for both specificity
as to duration of contract and consideration, many scholars have likened
that contract to a contract for a lease. Although the current Shi'a theolo-
gians in Iran have rejected this analogy and even invalidated mut'a
contracts which refer to the woman as the object of lease, 2 ' "[m]any of
the classic ulama, religious and legal scholars, and even some of the
contemporary legal experts have explicitly or implicitly alluded to the
similarities between the two, referring, unreflexively, to the woman as
the object of lease, musta'jirih."'
121
Beyond these three components, the temporary and permanent
marriages have different objectives and confer different rights and
118. Id. (stating that, "some Shi'ite jurists say the consent of the husband alone is
sufficient."); HAERI, supra note 6, at 53; NASIR, supra note 5, at 59.
119. HAERI, supra note 6, at 53.
120. Ayatollah Motaheri questions the analogy between the temporary marriage and a
lease. He states that permanent and temporary unions are "[b]oth marriages and both must be
accomplished with the proper marriage words and if the temporary marriage is worded with
the particular verses used for hiring and leasing, it will be void." MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at
66 (translated by author). He then indicates that hiring individuals is not a practice that has
been abolished and that in fact individuals such as physicians, civil servants, and others are
also hired. Id. Motaheri further states, without explanation, that the temporary wife is not a
hired person, but rather it is European and American actresses and models who are women
for hire. Id. at 66-67. He argues that "[tihe hired woman is that who for attracting customers
for an economic institution, using thousands of manners, most of which are artificial and for
the purpose of accomplishing the function of wage earning, appears on the television screen
and advertises for the benefit of a commercial good." Id. at 67 (translated by author).
121. HAERI, supra note 6, at 32 (citations omitted). A mut'a woman is believed to be the
object of lease because "she is contracted for a fixed period, with a fixed payment, for the
purpose of sexual pleasure, underscoring the pleasure principle of mut'a marriage. This dual
transaction of sex and goods [often money] is the core of mut'a marriage." Shahla Haeri, The
Institution of Mut'a Marriage in Iran: A Formal and Historical Perspective, in WOMEN AND
REVOLUTION IN IRAN, supra note 6, at 232 [hereinafter Institution].
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responsibilties to the parties. In choosing between the two types, the
Shi'a doctrine ideologically "distinguishes temporary marriage, mut'a,
from permanent marriage, nikah, in that the objective of mut'a is sexual
enjoyment whereas while that of nikah is procreation."
22
Both forms of marriage require that women obtain consent from
their fathers before engaging in the contract.2 However, generally,
females engaging in temporary marriages are widows or divorc6es. As
such they are not subject to a father's guardianship and have the autono-
my to contract voluntarily into marriage. 24 Virgins, however, must
always obtain their father's permission before contracting into any
marriage. The law does not forbid virgins to engage in mut'a. However,
because permanent marriages are favored legally and, socially, and
because virginity is immensely significant in determining a woman's
permanent marriage prospects, virgins generally do not enter into such
contracts. 125
122. HAERI, supra note 6, at 50. The "institution of marriage was centered around the
production of children and the caring for, protecting and providing for wives and children.
Hence, procreation rather than sensual pleasure was the prime factor in marriage." Farah,
supra note 53, at 15.
123. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 126. Khomeini has stated:
The girl who has reached puberty and is physically mature, meaning that she is
able to distinguish her own interests, if she wants to get married, and in the event
that she is a virgin, must, as a precautionary necessity, from her father or grandfa-
ther, receive permission, and her mother's or brother's permission is not necessary.
KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2384, at 413 (translated by author). See also MOTAHERI,
supra note 7, at 92-99. Women who are no longer virgins do not need to obtain their father's
permission. KHOMENI, supra note 85, matter 2385, at 413.
124. HAERI, supra note 6, at 5. Haeri states that
the greater frequency of sigheh marriages is among young divorced or widowed
women of the lower socioeconomic class.. . . A divorce usually places a woman in
a vulnerable situation in Iranian society. She is often perceived to be a moral and
economic burden on her family and a threat to the stability of other marriages
because she is believed to be sexually experienced.
Id. at 147. The "threat" that divorcdes pose can presumably be reduced if they contract into
temporary marriages, which may be one reason that the current regime is promoting the
institution.
125. Id. at 13. Azari explains that virginity is "Itihe most cherished possession for a girl
in Iran .... Her chances of a reasonable marriage depend more on this vital requirement than
any other features she may have." Sexuality and Women's Oppression, supra note 66, at 107.
See also Farah, supra note 53, at 16 (historically, "[m]arrying a virgin was stressed as a
principal factor in attaining a happy conjugal life."). Farah summarizes the rationale of a
prominent theologian, Imam al-Ghazali, for marrying a virgin: "The argument he set forth for
marrying a virgin was that it will draw the couple closer, since it would be the woman's first
intimate contact and she would not have had another with whom to compare her husband."
Id. The importance of virginity is also explained by Vieille:
The young girl must be a virgin on her wedding night; if she is not, she cannot be
established in honorable conditions and her family will be covered with shame....
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There are also various limitations in the rights and responsibilities of
the parties to the temporary marriage contract. As in permanent marriag-
es, there are limitations on interfaith marriages. Although Muslim men
may marry nonMuslim women, Muslim women are not permitted inter-
faith marriages of any kind. 12 6 Further, as in permanent marriages,
temporary wives must wait a certain amount of time at the expiration of
a temporary marriage contract before they can contract into another
marriage. 127 Again, this is in order to be sure of the paternity of any
children conceived in the relationship. In addition, women may not
contract to enter more than one temporary marriage at a time, as is the
case with permanent marriages. However, men may contract to marry an
unlimited number of temporary wives. 2 s Therefore, in addition to the
four permanent wives which Shi'a Muslim men are allowed to have,
they may also contract to enter marriage with as many temporary wives
as they wish.
The two types of marriage also differ in the ways that they may be
terminated. As stated earlier, it is generally not expected that individuals
contracting into temporary marriages will divorce; they simply wait until
the expiration of the duration of the contract. However, the husband in a
temporary marriage may unilaterally or both parties may mutually agree
to terminate the marriage contract before expiration. 29 In contrast, a
permanent marriage may be terminated in three ways: (1) divorce or
talaq; 30 (2) mutual consent; 131 and (3) annulment, faskh, by either the
The idea of the honor of families and lineages is in fact central in the question of
virginity: honor consists of giving and accepting only goods that are ritually pure.
The loss of virginity is an offense against honor, an irreparable loss of honor.
Vieille, supra note 1, at 453-54.
126. HAERI, supra note 6, at 52.
127. MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 57; KHALEGHI, supra note 7, at 309.
128. It is therefore "possible for a man of eighty with four permanent wives to enter into
any number of temporary marriages." Women and the Shii Ulama, supra note 41, at 22. This
too was the case under the Pahlavi regime before the Islamic revolution:
The number of temporary wives is not limited by Shiah Fiqh, and hence by the
Iranian law. Thus, a man is at liberty to contract as many temporary marriages as
he desires, subject to the sole condition that he must be financially and physically
capable of maintaining these wives and doing justice to them.
Introduction to FAMILY LAWS OF IRAN, supra note 67, at 9.
129. The temporary wife cannot terminate the contract because she is "the object of the
lease," HAERI, supra note 6, at 45, and because "the purpose of a mut'a marriage is enjoy-
ment, not of both partners, but of the husband only." Id. at 57.
130. The Arabic word talaq "is a derivative of the word tallaqa, which means to release
an animal." Horiarvar, supra note 16, at 372.
131. Id. at 375 (executed when "both parties agree that the marriage contract is a
nonworkable contract, one that should be dissolved; and based on this mutual consent the
parties return considerations, of iwad, to each other and declare the marriage dissolved.").
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husband or the wife. Under the permanent marriage, the woman, unlike
the woman contracting for a temporary marriage, may obtain a divorce.
However, even in a permanent marriage a woman's right to a divorce is
practically impossible to exercise: "The marriage contract used in Iran
lays down 16 circumstances under which a woman can get a divorce: a
man can get one without reason."' 32 Very often, it will be extremely
difficult to satisfy these conditions and the woman will not be able to
obtain a divorce.'33 This sometimes forces women to buy their way out
of their marriages, which is usually done by giving up their
brideprice. 134 The fact that women may have to give up their brideprice
and probably their children to the father's custody deters women from
proceeding with a divorce. 135 Although a recent reform of Iranian di-
vorce laws gives women more rights in these proceedings, the law's
goals as yet have not been realized in practice.
36
One of the primary advantages of temporary marriages is that chil-
dren resulting from such unions are considered legitimate and are given
inheritance rights from the father, as with children resulting from
permanent marriages. 37 However, while the permament wife holds
132. Iranian Women; Cover up, quick, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at 42. Although men
can obtain divorces easily, Bob Hepburn, Iran; Three Years After Khomeini, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, June 9, 1992, at A8, "women can seek divorces only if a husband is mentally ill,
suffers an incurable disease, cannot have children or is unwilling to support the family." Id.
Further, "Talaq permits a husband to divorce his wife at any time without the wife's knowl-
edge and without having her present at the proceeding." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 372.
133. "It is nearly impossible for women to file for divorce in this country.... Only if
her husband is proved insane or has been missing for four years will the courts approve the
woman's request." Katayon Ghazi, A Voice for Change; High-ranking Official in Iran Works
to Break Gender Barriers, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1992, at 12 (quoting a legal expert).
134. Azari, supra note 32, at 11. Despite the fact that the mahr in the marriage contract
is intended to provide for a woman after her divorce, "she is frequently forced to waive her
claim to mehr as a condition for her husband's consent to the divorce." Honarvar, supra note
16, at 379.
135. A Muslim woman "knows that in the event of a divorce the father retains guardian-
ship of the couple's children." Honarvar, supra note 16, at 379.
136. A recent report indicates that
Iran's clerical leaders have adopted a new divorce law granting unprecedented
rights to women. It allows a woman to seek compensation through the courts for
housework her husband ordered her to do during the marriage .... It also requires
that divorce be sanctioned only by civic courts, aiming to put an end to the com-
mon practice of men easily divorcing their wives against their wishes.
Sharif Imam-Jomeh, Iran Grants Rights to Women in New Divorce Law, The Reuter Library
Report, Dec. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. But see Iran Panel
Backs Divorce Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A12 ("Some Iranians say that the
measure will be difficult to put into effect given the existing contradictions between remnants
of the civil war from the old regime and Islamic law, which limit women's participation in
court proceedings.").
137. MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 57; NASIR, supra note 5, at 59; Khatib-Chahidi, supra
note 2, at 126.
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inheritance rights, the temporary wife does not. 3  Furthermore, the
temporary wife does not have "maintenance rights," which generally
means that the temporary husband does not have to provide economic
support for her during the course of the marriage, as he must for his
permanent wife. 39 These distinctions between the two types of
marriages highlight both the advantages and disadvantages for the
parties in a temporary marriage. The temporary marriage could be
considered advantageous because it represents a way for individuals to
legally engage in relationships which would otherwise result in the
parties' punishment, as explained in Part V.B. However, the institution
is also less formal than a nikah marriage and carries with it fewer
benefits and rights to the temporary wife. These disadvantages may
explain why few individuals have engaged in such relationships, despite
the promotion of the institution by the Iranian government. The
following discussion evaluates in detail the advantages and
disadvantages of the temporary marriage.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTION
OF TEMPORARY MARRIAGES
The above comparison of temporary and permanent marriages, at
least preliminarily, indicates that because of their permanence and
greater benefits to the woman, permanent marriages are more favorable.
One commentator notes that "[t]raditionally there has been a social
stigma associated with the 'sigheh' for women .... The result has been
that mainly women from working class or peasant origins have consent-
ed to this type of marriage and then usually to men of higher social
status and wealth than themselves. '' 4° The next Part analyzes why the
Shi'a theologians advocate the practice of temporary marriages and why
it is practiced by some individuals, while disregarded by others. The
first Section discusses the traditional and modern justifications for the
institution of mut'a. The Note then analyzes in detail the advantages and
disadvantages of temporary marriages to women.
138. KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2433, at 420; Azari, supra note 32, at 11-12.
"[W]hereas the children inherit, the wife cannot, as she does in the permanent contract
according to Shi'ite Law." Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 126.
139. Khomeni states: "The woman who is temporarily married even when pregnant does
not have maintenance rights." KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2432, at 420 (translated by
author). See also KHALEGHI, supra note 7, at 309; Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 126;
Azari, supra note 32, at 11-12; HAERI, supra note 6, at 59. Ayatollah Motaheri, however,
indicates that it may be possible to provide for maintenance rights in the marriage contract.
MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at 305. Maintenance rights were available to temporary wives under
the Pahlavi regime. Introduction to FAMILY LAWS OF IRAN, supra note 67, at 5.
140. Azari, supra note 32, at 18.
[Vol. 15:645
Temporary Marriages in Iran
A. Theological Basis for the Institution
of Temporary Marriages
The Shi'a theologians contend that Islam sanctions temporary mar-
riages: "[T]hey argue that mut'a marriage is sanctioned in the Qur'an
4:24, and that it has been permitted by the Prophet Muhammad him-
self." ' 4' There is evidence, however, which indicates that temporary
marriages have prelslamic roots and were common to Arabian tribes.
42
Sunni Muslims also practiced temporary marriages until the second
Caliph, Omar, outlawed them.' 43 The Shi'a argue, however, that the
Qur'anic verse, from which they derive legitimacy for the practice, is
sufficiently explicit and cannot simply be annulled by the opinion of the
Caliph Omar.'" The Shi'a ideologians have stated that engaging in
temporary marriages is in fact rewarded by God because it directly





Whom your right hand possesses:
Thus hath God ordained
(Prohibitions) against you:
Except for these, all others
Are lawful, provided
Ye seek (them in marriage)
With gifts from your property
Desiring chastity, not lust.
Seeing that ye derive
Benefit from them, give them
Their dowers (at least)
As prescribed; but if,
After a dower is prescribed, ye agree
Mutually (to vary it),
There is no blame on you,
And God is All-knowing
All-wise.
The Holy Qur'an, supra note 43, S.IV.24, at 187. See also KHALEGHI, supra note 7, at
306-07. Shi'a theologians believe that mut'a "incurs God's reward, savab, that it is approved
by the Prophet, and that it was practiced by many of his companions and other revered Shi'i
leaders." HAERI, supra note 6, at 6 (citations omitted). But see Women and the Shii Ulama,
supra note 41, at 22 (stating that "[tihere is a great difference of opinion over this verse as
some interpreters actually read or add words to the Surah which some others do not accept.").
142. HAERI, supra note 6, at 49; Farah, supra note 53, at 14. In the prelslamic period,
"the Arabs practiced two types of marriage which were collectively termed Sadiqa.... The
two types of Sadiqa marriage arrangements were: the muta marriage and the beena marriage."
Honarvar, supra note 16, at 365.
143. In contrast to the Shi'a, "[t]he Sunnis view mut'a to be a form of prostitution and
as such is banned by all Sunni legal schools." Zolan, supra note 21, at 188.
144. Farah, supra note 53, at 14.
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challenges Omar's ban, which they believe contravened actual Islamic
practice during the time of the Prophet. 45
According to Shi'a theologians there were four main reasons for the
Prophet's allowance of temporary marriages in the early Islamic
period:' 6 (1) they provided a legal framework for individuals to engage
in sexual relations in times of war when men were separated from their
families; (2) they satisfied individuals' sexual needs; 147 (3) they
represented a way for widows of wars to be provided for; 148 and (4) they
provided legitimacy and thus inheritance rights to children born to
individuals engaging in extramarital relations.
149
Commentators also note modern justifications for engaging in tem-
porary marriages. Because engaging in temporary marriages brings
women monetary benefits, some see the institution as a means of eco-
nomic support for needy women. Shi'a theologians fear that unless
women are allowed to support themselves in this manner, they might
resort to prostitution. 5 ° This may be a valid concern given the limited
employment and educational opportunities for women under the current
Iranian regime. 5'
Furthermore, theologians believe that "reintroducing [mut'a] to the
society [is] the appropriate Islamic response to resolving human (read
'men's') needs for multiple sexual partners."'' 52 Allowing men to
contract into multiple marriages presumably enables them to indulge in
their sexual desires, which many believe are uncontrollable and
145. HAERI, supra note 6, at 7.
146. See'generally Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 263.
147. Mut'a has been described as "a divinely recommended solution for the gratification
of unavoidable sexual drive[.]" HAERI, supra note 6, at 78.
148. Id. at 156.
149. Although, if "a mut'a wife becomes pregnant, the child's legitimacy is legally
secured on the basis of the Islamic maxim, 'the child is of the bed,'" because "a contract of
mut'a marriage requires no witnesses or registration, however, it is difficult to prove the
validity of a claim." Id. at 55.
150. Id. at 157. Haeri disagrees with this analysis, however, arguing that
[m]ost sigheh marriages-short-term ones in particular-are not economically
advantageous, particularly since women have to abstain from sexual intercourse for
at least forty-five days after it ends. Although the financial arrangement does
temporarily assist some women in precarious economic circumstances, money is
not the only, or even the greatest, impetus for most of these women's sigheh
contracts.
Id. at 149-50.
151. See supra note 77.
152. HAERI, supra note 6, at 8 (citation omitted).
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insatiable. 153 Also, under the current regime, the poor economic situation
places a heavy burden on young individuals who wish to marry and start
a family. Temporary marriages therefore provide "a very timely and
modem means for satisfying youth's sexual needs without preventing
them from pursuing their educational and professional objectives.""
The current regime is also promoting the practice of temporary marriage
because the Iran-Iraq war left many widows in Iran. As noted earlier in
Part III, women, especially if they are single, are considered to be
sexual temptresses. As such, they could cause men, whose sexual
appetites are considered uncontrollable, to engage in extramarital affairs.
In order to prevent these occurences, the current regime advocates that
these women be allowed to engage in temporary marriages.
55
B.. Advantages of Mut'a: Preservation of the
Family and Social Harmony
The current Islamic regime promotes mut'a and some individuals
engage in it because they believe that temporary marriages preserve the
153. See supra note 63.
154. HAERI, supra note 6, at 8 (citation omitted). See also MOTAHERI, supra note 7, at
58-60. Azari explains Ayatollah Motaheri's views:
[He] proposes the temporary marriage as a complement to permanent marriage in
an age when he maintains that 'the gap between natural puberty and social puberty,
or the ability to start a family, has widened.' He acknowledges the sexual drives of
a young person as having great significance in their lives, and the fact that those
young people who plan to build a career are not prepared to take on the responsi-
bilities of marriage till long after their sexual awakening. He subsequently proposes
that rather than expect the young to enter a period of celibacy or indulge in free
sexual unions - which he calls 'sexual communism' - we should encourage them
to enter into temporary marriages.
Azari, supra note 32, at 18. See also Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 264.
155. A Western journalist remarks that
[t]he two main reasons for the government campaign to secure respectability for
sigheh are the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and Iran's economic crisis. The war
widowed hundreds of thousands of Iranian women. They were shunned as potential
wives in permanent marriages, and yet were not able to have sex legally. Economic
crisis means that marriage is beyond the means of huge numbers of young, jobless
Iranians facing dire frustration because of the punishments laid down for sexual
relations outside marriage.
Christopher Walker, A Marriage of Pleasure, TimEs (LoNDON), Apr. 27, 1992, at 4. The
Islamic regime's promotion of temporary marriages has been criticized by Iranians them-
selves: An article in Kayhan Havai criticized President Rafsanjani's speech promoting the
institution, "saying they could 'justify purely pleasure-seeking acts' and the president should
make permanent marriages easier rather than advocate short-term ones." Anti-vice March in
Tehran After Rafsanjani's Call on Sex, The Reuter Library Report, Dec. 7, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
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family and therefore contribute to social harmony. This Section
illustrates the rationale behind this belief.
Islam, like most other religions, considers the family a very impor-
tant institution, and its protection is critical to the preservation of social
stability. The protection of the family is also an important goal of the
current Islamic regime in Iran. Article 11 of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic states: "Since the family is the fundamental unit of
Islamic society, all pertinent laws, regulations, and programs must tend
to facilitate the foundation of a family and to protect the sanctity and
stability of family relations on the basis of the law and the ethics of
Islam."
56
Islam perceives sexuality as "absolute because it is anchored in
nature, it is instinctual, unchanging, and inescapable.' ' 57 As such, sexu-
ality threatens the family and therefore society: Uncontrolled and un-
checked sexual urges could lead individuals to engage in extramarital
and premarital affairs that would threaten the stability of the family.
Because of this threat, in Islam both extramarital and premarital sexual
relations are strictly forbidden, and individuals engaging in such acts are
punished: "The term zina denotes the illegal sexual act which could be
fornication, adultery, incest or rape.... In the Koran it is stated that
zina should be punished by flogging - a hundred lashes for both the
man and the woman."' 58 Under the present Islamic fundamentalist
regime, "IS]toning, flogging, crucifixion and amputation are among the
legal punishments in Iran for people who indulge in sexual intercourse
outside marriage[.]"' 59
The goal of Islam in preventing extramarital sexual relations,
156. CONSTITUTIO N, supra note 35, at 32.
157. HAERI, supra note 6, at 5.
158. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 118 (citation omitted).
159. Iran: "Pattern of Cruelty and Inhumanity" Condemned by Amnesty, Inter Press
Service, May 13, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File. One
Western journalist observes that
According to the Koran, Islam's holy book, a single woman convicted of adultery
can receive 80 lashes. Though not in the Koran, under Islamic tradition the
maximum penalty for a man or woman convicted of adultery is death by stoning.
Western diplomats say they know of at least three cases of this. Opponents of the
Islamic regime say many more have suffered this punishment.
Claude van England, Marrying a married man in Iran, and other everyday events, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 11, 1986, at 9.
[Vol. 15:645
Temporary Marriages in Iran
however, does not include endorsing celibacy.16 In fact,
Celibacy ... is considered evil and unnatural. . . [Islam's] objec-
tive is to minimize human suffering and to satisfy not just the
yearnings of the spirit but also the burnings of the flesh. Acknowl-
edging the pleasures of the flesh, the Shi'i ulama simultaneously
view it as dangerous and disturbing to the social order[, and be-
lieve that] it must be legally contained and morally guided.
161
In order to prevent the occurrence of extramarital relations in Iran,
there is strict sexual segregation of males and females.' 62 This is
enforced by secluding women physically or veiling them.163 Jane
160. Commentators indicate that "the sexual drive is a natural instinct that God has
ordained. Islam has placed sanctions on this drive in order to avert transgressions, especially
that of fornication." Farah supra note 53, at 33. In fact, "[slexual intercourse was a good
religious deed for the Muslim male. The Koran stated that women were a field for men to
cultivate, and men were advised to cultiate them as often as they would." BULLOUGH ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 117. Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the current President of Iran, stated in a speech
in 1990 that "God has created certain needs in the human being and he does not want them
left unanswered. The instincts that we have have been created on a calculated basis, and they
must be administered in a calculated way." Iran; Rafsanjani on the Uses of 'Temporary
Marriage' Custom; Palestinian Issue, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 3, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Rafsanjani speech].
161. HAERI, supra note 6, at 5 (citation omitted). See also Sexuality and Women's
Oppression, supra note 66, at 92. Azari explains that
[I]n the Muslim social order it is not expected that an individual should strive to
eradicate his sexual desires or to control them simply for the sake of control, but he
must use them according to the demands of religious law. Furthermore, if these
desires are suppressed or used wrongly, they are a recognized threat to the Muslim
order.
Id.
162. In Iran, "all contact between men and women is forbidden. Men and women no
longer shake hands when meeting in public." Asayesh, supra note 1, at Bi. See also
Honarvar, supra note 16, at 383. Azari explains the traditional Islamic view of male-female
relations:
Comradeship and friendship cannot be the basis for a man-woman relationship.
When a man and a woman are alone together sexual involvement is inevitable: The
man cannot resist the woman, as she is the embodiment of sex itself, and the
woman cannot refuse the man. As a result, all forms of communication between
men and women take on a sexual content and are suspect.
Sexuality and Women's Oppression, supra note 66, at 106.
163. Shahla Haeri, Women, Law, and Social Change in Iran, in WOMEN IN CONTEMPO-
RARY MUSLIM SOCIETIES 209, 216 (Jane I. Smith ed., 1980) [hereinafter Women] ("Once
outside of their homes, women needed another protective device to keep the segregation of
the sexes intact. The veil replaced the protective walls and became woman's shield in
public."). The reason that it is women, and not men, who are secluded and veiled, is closely
related to the Islamic fundamentalists' perception of female sexuality:
[T]he 'implicit theory' of female sexuality as revealed by Imam Ghazali, and
echoed by some of the Iranian Muslim thinkers, such as Motahari, casts the woman
as the hunter and the man as the passive victim.... Thus the social order has been
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Khatib-Chahidi illustrates with examples the present situation in Iran:
Men and women in each other's company outside the home can be
stopped by Revolutionary Guards and questioned as to their rela-
tionship. In one case the man and woman were first cousins but
this did not prevent their being taken before the nearest komiteh to
have their relationship further investigated. The headmistress of a
bilingual English-Persian school in Tehran was heavily censored
for not segregating the three-to-five-year-olds in the kindergarten
class and was given a long lecture on the immorality of the West
where co-educational schools were permitted which, according to
the school inspector, encouraged such vices as homosexuality."'
Islam requires sexual segregation because it views human sexuality as
dangerous to the social order, if not contained within an acceptable
framework. The only men and women who are allowed to mutually
interact are those already married to each other or "those between whom
marriage is forbidden: they are said to be mahram to each other."'165 The
term mahram refers to a relationship between individuals who are linked
by blood, marriage, or sexual ties.'6 Initially, therefore, by limiting the
constructed so as to subjugate the woman's power and neutralize its disruptive
effects.
Azari, supra note 32, at 94-95. Zolan further illustrates the fundamentalists' fear of the
societal effects of unrestrained female sexuality:
[W]omen are seen as being temptresses, and ... men are seen as possessing
extremely weak wills, thereby being incapable of resisting the temptation created
by women. It logically follows from these views that women present a threat to the
smooth functioning of society and therefore it would be better if they were kept out
of men's sights and in the seclusion of their homes.
Zolan, supra note 32, at 186. See also supra notes 77-78.
164. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 132.
165. Id. at 114. See supra note 110 for text of Qur'an containing this prohibition. Haeri
states that, "Islamic law conceives of gender relationships within the two categories of lawful,
mahram, and unlawful, namahram. Men and women must not associate freely with each other
unless their relationship is prescribed either by blood or by marriage." HAERI, supra note 6, at
76.
166. The Persian term namahram
literally denotes any person of the opposite sex whose kinship does not represent
an impediment for marriage .... For the devout Moslem any sharing of space with
na-mahram persons is to be avoided as it could lead to illegal sexual intercourse
outside the bonds of marriage, which is forbidden to all Moslems.
Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 114. There are four categories of mahram persons: (1) Blood
relatives, which includes "a man or woman and their ascendents or descendants in the same
line, their full or half-brothers and sisters, and their maternal and paternal aunts and uncles of
whatever generation."; (2) milk relatives, which incur "the same rules as for blood relatives"
and refer to such situations "where a woman suckles another's child."; (3) relatives by
marriage; and (4) relationships arising from illegitimate sexual relationships, where "the same
prohibition as for blood relatives applies in the case of illegitimate sexual unions which result
in the birth of illegitimate offspring." Id. at 116-17.
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physical comingling of the sexes by segregation, sexual urges ;are
supposedly suppressed.
In order both to accommodate the sexual urges of human beings and
to maintain the moral fabric of the social order, the ulama (or clergy)
offer as a solution the institution of temporary marriages as "alternative
legal frameworks for making such associations easily attainable."' 67
Temporary marriage contracts, because the law recognizes them as legal,
enable individuals to become mahram to each other, and therefore they
are able to be in each other's company without the necessity of veiling.
They can also legally engage in sexual intercourse, if they so choose. A
modern Iranian scholar justifies this rationale:
Considering the fact that permanent marriage does not satisfy the
instinctive sexual urge of certain men and that adultery and forni-
cation are according to Islam among the most deadly poisons,
destroying the order and purity of human life, Islam has legiti-
mized temporary marriage under special conditions of which it
becomes distinct from adultery and fornication and free of their
evils and corruption.' 6
As such, the institution of mut'a represents a mechanism by which the
clergy seek legally to control sexual relationships between individuals,
while preserving morality and preventing corruption. 69 For individuals,
"[t]he purpose of this form of sigheh 'marriage' is to remove the legal
distance between a man and a woman by creating a fictive 'marital
relation' . . . enabl[ing] the sexes to circumvent the law, to cross the
forbidden boundaries of sexual segregation legitimately, and to interact
more freely."' 70
Despite the fact that the institution of sexual mut'a is criticized by
both secular and devout Muslims as legalizing prostitution, it is argued
that "[t]he devout Moslem ... is likely to make good use of the
institution in its strictly nominal form to facilitate the sharing of space
with na-mahram persons inside and outside the home in a legal
manner."' " That is, the mut'a contract can be used fictively in order for
devout Moslems to overcome the barriers to male-female interaction
167. HAERI, supra note 6, at 5. The endorsement of temporary marriages is a recognition
of "the nature of human sexuality." Id. at 65. But see Vieille, supra note 1, at 467 (noting
that "[ilt is worth insisting here on a major contradiction of fact: this society that gives so
much value to sexual activity is sexually unhappy.").
168. Mahdavi, supra note 13, at 263 (quoting Sayed Hossein Nasr).
169. Rafsanjani reasons'that "[t]he struggle is that we must open the way, in a correct,
orderly and legal way, so that the natural desires of our young are satisfied." Rafsanjani
Speech, supra note 160.
170. HAERI, supra note 6, at 89.
171. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 126-27.
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imposed by the mahram-namahram distinction. In these fictive cases,
sexual consummation of the marriage contract is not intended.' For
example, even individuals such as servants are considered namahram
with respect to the household members they serve; this can prove
extremely problematic because being namahram means that the female
servants must be secluded or veiled from individuals in the household of
the opposite sex, which interferes with the efficient performance of their
chores. Therefore, individuals form temporary marriage contracts be-
tween the servant and a younger member of the household; this changes
the relationship of the servant to the other members of the household to
mahram, because the servant is now linked by marriage to an individual
who is linked by blood to other members of the household. 73 The prac-
tice thus allows the female servant to circumvent the rules requiring
veiling and seclusion from male household members.
Additionally, nonsexual temporary marriage contracts can be
arranged by parents of men and women who are dating or who are
engaged to be married. 74 Arranging the contract for dating couples
enables them to see each other legally. Where couples are engaged,
[w]hereas most 'westernized' Iranian parents would consider the
engagement (namzad) as sufficient proof of the boy's serious
intentions and allow the couple to see each other alone, some
religious parents insist either that they must conclude the perma-
nent marriage contract (aqd) before they can enjoy this freedom, or
arrange a temporary contract between them until the permanent one
takes place.
75
The temporary marriage contract, therefore, provides a legal frame-
work for individuals to overcome the barriers to male-female
socialization. By legalizing the relationship in contractual form, the
clergy are able to control these relationships in a legal framework. At
the same time, the social problems that uncontrolled sexuality could
cause, such as the disruption of the family, are supposedly held in check
by legitimizing extramarital sexual relations. Yet, despite these
perceived benefits, Iranians do not generally engage in temporary
172. Id. at 130.
173. Id. at 127. See also KHALEGHI, supra note 7, at 312.
174. Institution, supra note 121, at 236 ("A condition unique to mut'a marriage is the
possibility of agreement for nonsexual coexistence; the temporary spouses may agree to enjoy
each other's company in many other ways without having sexual intercourse."). Khomeini
sanctions the possibility of contracting into nonsexual temporary marriage. He states that the
husband may then only enjoy the woman in other ways, unless she later consents to sexual
intercourse. KHOMEINI, supra note 85.
175. Khatib-Chahidi, supra note 2, at 128-29.
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marriages. The disadvantages of mut'a, explained in the next Section,
provide the reasons for the Iranian people's general repudiation of the
institution.
C. Disadvantages of Mut'a
This Section illustrates the disadvantages of the institution of
temporary marriages. These characteristics have resulted in the practice's
rejection by the bulk of the Iranian population. First, the Section exam-
ines the problems with the form of the institution. Second, the Note
illustrates how certain characteristics of the temporary marriage, which
tend to disadvantage women, have led to its lower status in comparison
to the permanent marriage alternative.
1. Ambiguity of the Institution
One of the most important purposes of laws and legal institutions is
to provide a formal framework for individuals that yield a measure of
certainty. Certainty in law is necessary because it enables individuals to
gear their activities and expectations towards those laws and institutions.
One of the fundamental problems with mut'a is that its lack of formal
obligations renders it uncertain as a legal institution designed to govern
relationships:
[Alithough there is a legal framework for temporary marriage-and
this is emphasized by the ulama-legal loopholes and stratagems
also abound. That the contract is private, requiring no witnesses or
registration (despite efforts to change this), that men can leave their
temporary wives any time they want to, and that legally men can
deny their children without being put through an oath-taking proce-
dure (required in a contract of permanent marriage), all are evi-
dence of the ambiguity of the law and its blurred boundaries.
76
For example, if two individuals contracted into a temporary mar-
riage without a witness and without a proper registration, either
individual could deny its existence at any time. Such a denial could
prove problematic if the temporary marriage union produces a child
because the father can avoid paying for the child's maintenance by
simply denying that the marriage ever existed. Without witnesses and
formal registration, the temporary wife could never prove that there was
ever such a union in a court, and therefore, the child would be denied
both legitimacy and economic maintenance. 177
176. HAERI, supra note 6, at 202.
177. Haeri states that "[c]hildren seem to have been the real victims of unregistered
temporary marriages. Legally, the children of a temporary marriage have the same status as
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Because a mut'a contract can be formed by a simple oral agreement,
uncertainty of contract terms often arises. If a dispute arises, the terms
of the contract could be difficult to prove in a court. Therefore, by
allowing oral mut'a contracts, the legal framework disfavors individuals
who are not aware that these contract terms will probably not be en-
forceable.
The uncertainty and ambiguity that inheres in temporary marriage
contracts is undoubtedly a significant reason for Iranians' weariness of
the institution. In contrast, the permanent marriage "contract is endowed
with greater legal rigor and rigidity of form and fewer structural loop-
holes than is the case with mut'a marriage. The reciprocal rights and
obligations of the spouses are more extensive and enduring."' 78 These
advantages make the permanent contract one that is more desirable than
the temporary contract, which contains few guarantees. While,
[p]ermanent marriage bestows social prestige on the spouses, par-
ticularly the woman[,] ... the looseness of the temporary marriage
and the ambiguities inherent in it provide margins for alternative
interpretations of behavior, greater manipulation of the institution,
and improvisations of the content .... By the same token, al-
though the institution of temporary marriage theoretically confers
greater autonomy and decision-making power on women, at the
same time it leaves them vulnerable to the stigmatization, personal
ambivalence, and local gossip. 79
2. Disadvantages of Mut'a for Women
A second problem with temporary marriage is that it accords even
fewer rights to women than those available under permament marriage,
thus outweighing any advantages which might be gained by women
from the institution.
A variety of factors indicate that temporary marriages increase the
autonomy and independence of women, both at the contracting stage
and also within the marriage itself. At the contracting stage, women
actively initiate and negotiate the terms of the contract, 8 ' while in the
the children of a permanent marriage. Under the provisions of the new laws, however, the
children of an unregistered temporary marriage have an illegitimate status." Women, supra
note 163, at 228. The problem of unregistered temporary marriages contradicts one of the
institution's objectives, to provide legitimacy for children born outside a permanent marriage.
178. HAERI, supra note 6, at 66.
179. Id.
180. For example, "[wiomen often take the initiative and negotiate the terms of the
marriage contract themselves .... [S]igheh women are active subjects in control of the object
of exchange (their sexuality), negotiating the terms of its exchange personally." Id. at 81.
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permanent marriage these functions are usually reserved for the bride's
family and ultimately her father. Also, the temporary marriage gives
women more autonomoy. For example, in a temporary marriage, the
temporary wife's "degree of [] obedience is limited and is not as com-
plete as that of a permanent wife; ... She has greater freedom and
personal autonomy to establish relationships," and "[s]he may exercise
her will as long as her activities do not interfere with her husband's
rights[.] '"'8 In addition, because the temporary wife does not have to
live with her temporary husband, the woman is able to "preserve an
independent household but have an extra income."'
8 2
The independence which temporary marriages bestow on women is
outweighed by characteristics of the marriage that disadvantage women
and preserve the inequality between the sexes in Iran. These characteris-
tics are evident when analyzing mut'a both at the theoretical and practi-
cal levels.
Theoretically, although women experience a greater level of autono-
my in the temporary marriage, the institution was not initiated in order
to achieve this result. The woman in the temporary marriage is specifi-
cally referred to as the object of a lease. 183 Furthermore, the need to
gratify men's uncontrollable and unlimited sexual desires is the primary
rationale for the institution of mut'a. Shi'a theologians believe that
women contract into these unions primarily because of the financial
compensation which women receive.14 Women's sexual desires are not
given serious consideration. Commentators believe that the Shi'a Islamic
theologians are ambivalent to and misunderstand female sexuality. A
female Iranian anthropologist states that "Shi'i law appears to be
negating female sexuality by placing emphasis on reproduction in
permanent marriage or financial compensation in temporary marriage. '85
A man's legal right to have an unlimited number of temporary
marriages simultaneously reflects mut'a's primary purpose of meeting
male, sexual needs. In contrast, women may only contract into one
temporary marriage at a time and must wait a certain period of time
181. Id. at 59. Khomeini states that the temporary wife may leave her house without first
seeking her husband's permission. KHOMEINI, supra note 85, matter 2435, at 420.
182. Eric Hall, Deep Debate Over Temporary Islamic Marriage in Iran, The Reuter
Library Report, Feb. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
183. See supra note 120-21 and accompanying text.
184. Haeri confirms this analysis: "In the ulama's view, men's prime motivation is
sexual satisfaction .... Regarding women's motivation, however, they have been ambivalent,
never being certain of exactly what it is that a woman wants. Nonetheless, they have consis-
tently and uniformly maintained that women's motivation ought to be financial reimburse-
ment." HAERI, supra note 6, at 106-07.
185. Id. at 72.
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before remarrying. 86 The rationale which theologians have traditionally
advanced in support of the waiting period is the assurance of the legiti-
macy of children resulting from such unions; this reasoning, however,
appears outdated, in light of present scientific advances such as DNA
testing, which can be used to determine the parentage of children.
Hence, the traditional rationale which supports limiting women to one
temporary husband is no longer valid. However, because women are still
limited in this manner, it is clear that the institution of mut'a creates
disparate rights between men and women.
At the practical levels, mut'a disadvantages women, particularly
when it is compared with permanent marriages. The temporary marriage
grants women fewer rights and benefits than its permanent counterpart.
The woman in a temporary union can claim neither inheritance rights, 7
nor maintenance rights,'88 and she cannot institute divorce proceedings
against her temporary husband. 9 Further, Iranian Islamic society favors
permanent marriages and reveres women in their role as mothers. 9
Because mut'a is limited in duration, Iranians do not accord temporary
wives with the same level of prestige as women who enter into perma-
nent marriages.
These detrimental characteristics of temporary unions may explain
why only a few women engage in such arrangements; most of these
women are widows or divorc6es of lower economic status.'9 ' Therefore,
despite any increased autonomy women may obtain through such ar-
rangements, they are contracting into a marriage which their society
does not respect. Finally, the institution's rules fundamentally disadvan-
tage women by granting them even fewer rights than those given to
women in permanent marriages.
V. CONCLUSION
The legality of temporary marriages in Iran may seem incredible to
a Western observer. However, Iranian historical and traditional
186. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 138.
188. See supra note 139.
189. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
190. Haeri believes that the reason that marriage is favored is that women are under its
control:
As long as a woman is married that is, the commodity has been actualized, and her
sexuality is legally controlled or supervised by her husband, she enjoys greater
status and social prestige than do unmarried women in Iran. Her status is even
more firmly grounded if she has also produced a few children[.]
HAERI, supra note 6, at 147.
191. See supra note 124.
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developments, in conjunction with the Iranian view of women's role in
society, explain the existence of the institution.
Part V illustrated that the temporary marriage serves as a
fundamental tool in the current regime's efforts in controlling
individuals' behavior in a manner that is consistent with Islamic
precepts. In order to reconcile the goals of supressing extramarital
sexual relations and maintaining sexual segregation with the clashing
inevitability of human sexual desires, the Iranian clergy promotes
temporary marriages as a viable solution. Men contracting into these
relationships can satisfy their sexual needs legally; children resulting
from such unions are legitimized; and the sacred institution of the
family is protected.
Therefore, the institution represents just one of the pragmatic solu-
tions that Shi'a theologians have found in order to address social prob-
lems in a manner that is consistent with the fundamentalist Shi'a view
of morality. This "solution" is consistent with the manner in which the
Iranian regime's policies permeate people's lives, and it is also congru-
ent with the role of the shari'a as an ever-present code of legal jurispru-
dence which penetrates every area of Iranian people's de cisionmaking.
Furthermore, the characteristics of mut'a correspond with traditional
Shi'a Iranian views towards women. The institution is a design which
helps satisfy men's sexual desires but fails to recognize the women's
needs and desires. The institution fundamentally disadvantages women,
a characteristic which is consistent with Islam's traditional treatment of
women in Iran.
This Note suggests that two factors have prevented the general
acceptance of the temporary marriage in Iran. First, the institution lacks
legal rigor, a deficiency which causes uncertainty, deterring women
from entering such arrangements. For any legal institution to gain accep-
tance and legitimacy, its characteristics must exhibit some degree of
certainty and clarity. Second, the institution of temporary marriage gives
women even fewer rights and a lower status than its permanent marriage
counterpart. The temporary marriage's limited duration precludes women
from securing a permanent position in Iran's most revered social
institution, the family.
Nevertheless, the Iranian government may still find it possible to
successfully promote the use of temporary marriages. Initially, the
regime must increase the legal rigor of mut'a by perhaps requiring
witnessed written agreements. Also, women must be given a greater
incentive to enter into such unions. The rules of the temporary marriage
must thus be modified in order to strengthen women's rights vis-A-vis
their permanent wife counterparts. Finally, the government must engage
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in a more rigorous public relations campaign which promotes the institu-
tion. However, because the present structure of the temporary marriage
is well entrenched, any such changes are unlikely. Iranian society is thus
not likely to realize the purported benefits of temporary marriages
without first altering the institution.
